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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for 
securing the borders of the United States from those people and things that 
would do the United States harm. The Office of Field Operations (OFO) is the 
office responsible for securing the Ports of Entry (POEs). CBP/OFO has 
dedicated personnel, technology, infrastructure and resources assigned to the 
inbound inspections for processing those travelers and inbound processing has 
been a national priority of CBP since its inception in 2003. Although CBP/OFO 
has the authority to conduct outbound inspections, there is little infrastructure, 
intelligence sharing or technology at the POEs for conducting outbound 
operations. Some POEs are conducting outbound operations with officers that 
have been taken from the inbound staffing models. However, at the time of 
writing this thesis, CBP does not have a national policy mandating POEs conduct 
outbound operations. On the Southwest Border (SWB), the Mexican Drug 
Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are continuing to smuggle bulk cash and 
weapons into Mexico and border violence continues to increase. This thesis 
makes a recommendation of what the best policy option for outbound operations 
would be to implement on the SWB. 
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT..................................................................... 2 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION(S)................................................................. 4 
C.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY............................................................ 4 
1. Policy Options Analysis.......................................................... 4 
a. Option A—Status Quo .................................................. 4 
b. Policy Option B—Mirror the Inbound Solution........... 5 
c. Policy Option C—Hybrid .............................................. 5 
2. Assessment Criteria ................................................................ 6 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH......................................................... 9 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................ 11 
III.  CBP’S MANAGEMENT OF POES ............................................................... 13 
A. AUTHORITY FOR CBP TO CONDUCT OUTBOUND 
OPERATIONS AT THE LAND BORDER POES................................ 14 
B. CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS RELATING TO ENTRY/EXIT 
PROGRAMS IMPLEMENTED BY DHS THUS FAR AT THE POES. 16 
C. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES FOR EXIT CONTROL....... 17 
D. CURRENT DHS PROCESSES ON OUTBOUND ACTIVITIES ......... 18 
IV.  THREATS FROM DTOS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POES................ 21 
A.  DRUG TRAFFICKING........................................................................ 21 
B. HUMAN SMUGGLING....................................................................... 25 
C. BORDER VIOLENCE......................................................................... 26 
D.  WEAPONS TRAFFICKING................................................................ 29 
E. BULK CASE SMUGGLING ............................................................... 31 
F.  CORRUPTION ................................................................................... 32 
G. NATIONAL STRATEGY .................................................................... 33 
V.  POLICY OPTIONS........................................................................................ 37 
A.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM ............................................................... 37 
B.  POLICY OPTIONS............................................................................. 37 
1. Policy Option A—Status Quo ............................................... 37 
2. Policy Option B—Mirror the Inbound................................... 38 
3. Policy Option C—Hybrid ....................................................... 40 
VI.  POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS..................................................................... 45 
A.  LINCOLN-JUAREZ BRIDGE POE..................................................... 45 
1. Policy Option A—Status Quo ............................................... 46 
2. Policy Option B—Mirror Inbound ......................................... 48 
3. Policy Option C—Hybrid Solution........................................ 54 
B.  SAN YSIDRO POE............................................................................. 57 
1. Policy Option A—Status Quo ............................................... 57 
2. Policy Option B—Mirror Inbound Processing..................... 60 
 viii
3. Policy Option C—Hybrid Solution........................................ 63 
C. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 66 
VII.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................... 69 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 75 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 81 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Lincoln-Juarez Outbound Inspections ................................................ 46 
Figure 2. San Ysidro Outbound Operations....................................................... 57 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Assessment Criteria ............................................................................. 8 
Table 2. FY 2008 Drug Weight (Pounds) ......................................................... 22 
Table 3. FY 2009 Drug Weight (Pounds) ......................................................... 23 
Table 4. FY 2010 Drug Weight (Pounds) ......................................................... 23 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ATF  Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives  
 
BEST  Border Enforcement Security Task Force  
 
CBP  Customs and Border Protection  
CBP/OFO  Customs and Border Protection/Office of Field Operations  
 
DEA  Drug Enforcement Administration 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security  
DMIA  Data Management Improvement Act of 2000  
DOJ  Department of Justice  
DTOs  Drug Trafficking Organizations  
DWI  Driving While under the Influence  
 
EU  European Union  
 
GAO  Government Accountability Office  
GS  General Scale 
 
ICE  Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IIRIRA  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996  
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
OBP  Office of Border Patrol 
OFO  Office of Field Operations  
 
POE  Port of Entry  
PPAE  Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation  
 
SWB  Southwest Border  
 
UK  United Kingdom 
U.S.  United States 
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture  
US-VISIT  U.S. Visit and Immigrant Status Indicator Program  
 
WHTI  Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to thank my husband, Kelly for watching the television 
with the volume turned down so that I could get my schoolwork done. However, 
seriously, I could not have done this without your love and support throughout 
this process. I would also like to thank my mom, my dad, Janet, my sisters and 
brothers and the rest of my family for cheering me on. I love you all! 
To my friends who understood when I could not spend time with them 
during this process and who supported me and gave me words of 
encouragement the entire way, I thank you!  
I would also like to thank my classmates who continued to check on me to 
get this thesis done! I will miss you guys!  
Lastly, I would like to thank all of the men and women of CBP that work so 
hard every day to help keep America safe. I go on the journey with you everyday 
and am grateful to each of you!  
 
 xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for 
securing the borders of the United States from those people and things that 
would do the United States harm. The Office of Field Operations (OFO) is the 
office responsible for securing the Ports of Entry (POEs). CBP enforces the 
import and export laws and regulations at the POEs in addition to immigration 
and agriculture laws and regulations. CBP/OFO has dedicated personnel, 
technology, infrastructure and resources assigned to the inbound inspections for 
processing those travelers and goods attempting to enter the United States. 
Inbound processing and the expediting of legitimate travelers and trade into the 
United States has been a national priority of CBP since its inception in 2003.  
Although Customs and Border Protection/Office of Field Operations 
(CBP/OFO) has the authority to conduct outbound inspections, little infrastructure 
and technology exists at the POEs for conducting outbound operations. Some 
POEs are conducting outbound inspections with officers that have been taken 
from the inbound staffing models. However, at the time of writing this thesis, CBP 
does not have a national policy mandating POEs conduct outbound operations.  
On the Southwest Border (SWB), the Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) are continuing to smuggle bulk cash and weapons into 
Mexico and border violence continues to increase. This thesis makes a 
recommendation of what the best policy option would be to implement on the 
SWB. This thesis does not focus on air or sea POEs or any of the northern land 
border POEs. However, that does not mean that the same policy could not be 
implemented or adjusted for the northern land border POEs to address the threat 
that CBP faces in that environment. 
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A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The lack of an outbound policy on the SWB inhibits the ability of CBP to 
detect persons attempting to export undeclared currency over $10,000, 
ammunition and weapons into Mexico. It also hinders the ability to track people, 
vehicles and other items or merchandise departing the United States.  
Individuals wanted as possible criminals or terrorists can utilize this 
weakness and exit into Mexico undetected. In addition, the smuggling of bulk 
cash into Mexico allows the Mexican DTOs to continue to produce, smuggle and 
distribute narcotics in the United States. The smuggling of the weapons into 
Mexico allows the DTOs to continue to combat Mexican law enforcement, the 
military and other rival cartels and sustain their operations and violence.  
The 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment published in February 2010 
by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) described the Mexican DTOs as the 
greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States (DOJ, 2010, p. 9). In 2010, 
DOJ stated that the Mexican DTOs are active in more cities in the United States 
than any other DTO (DOJ, 2010, p. 9). President Caledron of Mexico and 
President Obama agree that the weapons and currency smuggling from the 
United States into Mexico is a threat that must be addressed (Beittel, 2009, p. 2).  
The U.S. Patriot Act made money laundering more difficult for DTOs to 
place proceeds from illicit drugs sales in U.S. institutions. Thus, the Mexican 
DTOs use bulk cash smuggling out of the United States into Mexico as the 
primary method for moving their profits (DOJ, 2010, p. 9). Tens of billions of 
dollars are smuggled into Mexico via POEs on the SWB each year (DOJ, 2010, 
p. 47).  
In addition to bulk cash smuggling, the Mexican DTOs purchase high-
powered weapons to smuggle them back into Mexico via the SWB. According to 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, (ATF), the DTOs 
acquire thousands of weapons each year and smuggle the weapons into Mexico 
via the SWB (DOJ, 2010, p. 2). These weapons are used to control territory in 
 3
Mexico and drug smuggling routes inside both Mexico and the United States. In 
addition, the weapons allow the DTOs to combat Mexican law enforcement and 
military forces.  
The United States has a high demand for the importation of illicit narcotics 
and it is one of the highest demand countries in the world. The rise in illicit 
importation, distribution and use of drugs in the United States goes against what 
the United States represents. The profits of this illicit activity fund terror, which 
corrode the democracy upon which the United States is built. All these issues 
represent a threat to U.S. national security (Hutchinson, 2002, p. 1). 
The free flow of illicit proceeds from narcotics into Mexico allows the DTOs 
to pay their operating costs, bribe Mexican and U.S. law enforcement and 
government officials (Farah, 2010, p. 11). The ability to continue to export bulk 
cash on the SWB means that the DTOs can continue producing and distributing 
the very drugs being smuggled into the United States and sold on U.S. streets.  
POEs that do have CBP officers working southbound traffic (outbound) do 
so with little to no infrastructure to stop vehicles or pedestrians to determine if 
they are involved in illegal activities. The lack of an outbound policy and 
infrastructure across the SWB is a homeland security issue because of the 
effects of the DTO’s illicit activities carried out in the United States across the 
entire SWB. In addition, the lack of an outbound infrastructure also significantly 
decreases the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to track departures of 
people and vehicles from the United States on the SWB.  
The SWB does not possess the facilities or resources mirroring the entry 
process along the SWB that would allow for enhanced screening and secondary 
processing to identify those persons or vehicles departing the United States. The 
SWB also cannot ascertain what those people and vehicles are transporting. 




them, and in many cases, with little to no intelligence from the U.S. intelligence 
community of foreign partners, which limits the ability of the CBP/OFO to be 
successful in detecting bulk cash and weapons smuggling on the SWB.  
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
What type of outbound policy needs to be developed and implemented on 
the SWB to maximize CBP’s ability to identify bulk cash and weapons being 
smuggled into Mexico?  
What are the policy options, applicable strengths and weaknesses of each 
policy and a recommended policy? 
C.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis develops three alternatives for potential outbound policies for 
the SWB and analyzes each policy option using two POEs currently conducting 
outbound operations on the SWB to determine which alternative presented is the 
most viable to implement. This policy option focuses on identifying bulk cash and 
weapons on the SWB.  
1. Policy Options Analysis 
The possible policy options for addressing this issue range from 
continuing to operate under the status quo, which is a hit or miss option for 
detecting bulk cash and weapons smuggling destined for Mexico, to mirroring the 
inbound solution in the outbound environment at each SWB POE, to a hybrid 
model that would include some infrastructure, personnel, technology and 
additional intelligence sharing from federal, state and local law enforcement 
entities.  
a. Option A—Status Quo 
The first policy option would be to keep the status quo and not 
change the way that CBP is currently conducting outbound inspections on the 
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SWB. As of the writing of this thesis, a CBP policy that articulates the primary 
and secondary goals of the outbound program does not exist. Some POEs on 
the SWB have officers dedicated to outbound inspections and some POEs do 
not. Option A intends for the SWB POEs to continue to operate as they are 
currently. This policy option would allow management to determine local needs 
focusing on inbound inspections and other priorities.  
b. Policy Option B—Mirror the Inbound Solution 
The second policy option would be to mirror the inbound inspection 
process and infrastructure. Key to mirroring an inbound inspection process in the 
outbound environment would be the design and implementation of the 
infrastructure to accommodate facilities for primary and secondary inspections on 
both vehicles and pedestrians entering Mexico. In addition, the infrastructure to 
interview, search and detain vehicles and cars that are potential violators or 
subjects of interest to CBP would be required. This option would take the current 
infrastructure and personnel in the inbound environment and place it in the 
outbound environment as a solution for outbound inspections on the SWB. 
c. Policy Option C—Hybrid 
The hybrid policy option would focus on individual POEs and 
assess what infrastructure is currently in place in the outbound environment and 
what could be put into place to allow officers to work outbound operations more 
frequently. The hybrid solution would call for some infrastructure upgrades on a 
site-by-site basis. As the infrastructure is being assessed on an individual basis 
for each POE, a technology assessment could go hand and hand with that 
assessment. A determination could be made to identify what technology could be 
put in place for outbound officers to provide them a better chance of identifying 
those vehicles, and pedestrians who are potential terrorists, DTO members, 
targets of investigations or wanted for a crime. Additional personnel would be 
required for operating in whatever additional infrastructure and technology 
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implemented. A key component to the hybrid solution is an intelligence-based 
network possibly established at the highest levels in the Department of 
Homeland Security and CBP. This network should focus on both internal and 
external stakeholders to maximize CBP’s ability to identify targets of bulk cash 
and weapons smugglers.  
2. Assessment Criteria 
The criteria for judging each option is to assess two POEs currently 
performing outbound inspections and review how each policy option works at 
each of the two locations. The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge POE in Laredo, Texas and 
the San Ysidro POE are the two POEs examined for each policy option because 
they are both currently conducting outbound operations. Each location has 
assigned personnel and do pulse surge operations similar to a Driving While 
under the Influence (DWI) checkpoint that state and local police departments 
perform randomly. The idea is for inspections to be performed at random times of 
the day with different days off.  
The Lincoln-Bridge in Laredo, Texas was chosen because the officers 
performing outbound inspections have been conducting these operations for 
several years, and in 2009, they were the most successful in identifying bulk 
cash and weapons being smuggled into Mexico. San Ysdiro has a fairly new 
outbound team but did identify attempts to smuggle some bulk cash into Mexico 
in 2009. Both locations have dedicated personnel working on the outbound 
teams. The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge does have some infrastructure and some 
technology in the southbound lanes leading into Mexico while San Ysidro has 
little to no infrastructure for outbound inspections. Lincoln-Juarez Bridge is 
located on a city road with stoplights every block that slows down traffic as the 
vehicles approach the outbound officers. The San Ysidro outbound teams work 
on a high volume interstate where the cars are traveling in excess of over 70 
miles an hour. The San Ysidro outbound team must set up on the freeway using  
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government vehicles and cones to block lanes to slow down traffic before 
approaching the outbound officers. In addition to the above criteria, the author 
has been to both locations and viewed outbound operations at each.  
Each POE is examined to determine how each policy option would benefit 
their outbound efforts or inhibit them and how feasible they are to implement. The 
criteria in each option for determining the best possible solution is to assess the 
amount of bulk cash detected, the amount of weapons seizures identified, ease 
of implementation, cost of each option and the free flow of traffic. These criteria 
are important because the goal of the policy recommendation is to prevent bulk 
cash and weapons smuggling into Mexico. To do so, CBP needs to increase the 
ability to detect more bulk cash and weapons destined for Mexico. The ease of 
implementation must be reviewed to determine if an option is feasible and how 
many barriers are in the way of implementing the options. The ability to maintain 
the free flow of traffic is one of the missions of CBP and has high visibility within 
the private and public sector of the communities. The costs of each policy option 
provide a high-level view of how much it takes to implement a policy option. 
Together, the criteria are analyzed to determine the best policy option to be 
implemented.  
Based on the bulk cash detected, the assessing criteria ranges from low to 
high. Low means that the policy option does not enhance the ability for CBP to 
detect more bulk cash and that less than $5 million dollars are identified using a 
policy option. Medium indicates that up to $10 million may be detected if a policy 
option were implemented and that over $10 million dollars in bulk cash is 
detected if a policy option were to be implemented.  
Based on weapons seizures, the assessment criterion is the same as the 
weapons except for the amount of weapons seizures. Low means that the policy 
option is likely to detect less than 10 weapons seizures; medium detects up to 20 
and high signifies that the implementation of the policy option provides the POE 
with over 21 weapons seizures.  
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The ease of implementation of each policy option is dependent upon how 
many barriers the CBP must overcome in each location. For example, the 
requirement to purchase property rights to expand the POE for southbound 
operations, the ability to acquire a budget, and the ability to assign officers to the 
outbound environment are some barriers that the POEs may need to overcome. 
Easy indicates that one barrier must be overcome; medium indicates 2–3 barriers 
to overcome and difficult indicates four or more barriers to overcome to 
implement a policy option.  
The cost indicates the amount it would take to implement an individual 
solution. For the purposes of this thesis, the items for the cost criteria to assess 
each policy option are limited to the lanes, personnel and a rough estimate on an 
outreach campaign. This thesis does not provide a full cost estimate to be used if 
a policy option is implemented but does provide an overall view of the differences 
in each option. Low indicates that the policy option costs less than $10 million to 
implement; medium is less than $20 million; and high indicates that the policy 
option costs over $20 million dollars to implement.  
The free flow of traffic denotes how long the wait times would be if a policy 
option were implemented. High flow of traffic indicates that the free flow is less 
than a 10-minute wait time to reach the outbound inspection, medium is a wait 
time of less than 20 minutes and low is a wait time of 21 minutes or more.  
 






Amount of Bulk Cash 
Detected 
Low High High 
Number of Weapons 
Seizures 
Low Medium High 
Ease of Implementation Easy Difficult Medium 
Cost Low High Medium 
Free Flow of Traffic  High Low High 
Table 1.   Assessment Criteria 
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Each criteria is examined together to determine the best policy option for 
CBP to implement. The ideal policy option would be to have the amount of bulk 
cash detected as high; the amount of weapons seizures as high; the ease of 
implementation as easy; the cost low and the free flow of traffic as high. The 
policy option that is feasible to implement and is the closest to the perfect criteria 
is the policy option recommended for implementation on the SWB. 
 D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The research for this thesis on an outbound policy for CBP on the SWB 
will compliment the current literature available on the subject. It will provide a 
policy approach to address the issues of arms and bulk cash smuggling across 
the SWB. Policy makers will be able to use this thesis as a basis for 
implementation of future work on an outbound policy for CBP. 
The immediate consumer of this research will be the management of CBP, 
the agency responsible for developing and implementing policy for the SWB as it 
relates to people and goods crossing both into and out of the United States.  
The goal of this research and execution of this thesis is to develop a 
feasible outbound policy for the SWB that CBP can implement. The analysis of 
the policy options uses two POEs to identify which solution is the best for CBP to 
implement.  
 10
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focused mainly on identifying relevant sources for 
potential solutions for developing an outbound policy for the SWB at the land 
border POEs. A fair number of sources were discovered that related to an 
outbound or exit solution. The documents reviewed in support of the literature 
review are statutes, U.S. and foreign government reports, academic studies on 
border issues, press analyses, and operational policy or planning documents 
from various U.S. government operational components.  
The sources have been organized into the following categories. 
 Authority for CBP to conduct outbound operations at the land 
border POEs 
 Congressional reports relating to entry/exit programs implemented 
by DHS thus far at the POEs 
 Foreign government practices for exit control 
 Current DHS processes on outbound activities 
 Alternatives for disrupting weapon smuggling 
 12
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III.  CBP’S MANAGEMENT OF POES 
U.S. CBP was established in 2003, which combined multiple agencies with 
different missions. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 abolished the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and placed the Border Patrol and the Office of 
Inspections under CBP. The U.S. Customs Service, with the exception of the 
Office of Investigations and Agriculture specialists from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), were also placed with CBP under the 
Department of Homeland Security. CBP’s mission is to keep terrorists and 
weapons of mass destruction out of the United States while securing and 
facilitating trade and travel, and enforcing agriculture, drug and immigration 
regulations (http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/).  
CBP has three operational components. The Office of Air and Marine is 
responsible for patrolling the nation’s air and sea borders to stop terrorists and 
drug smugglers before they enter the United States . The Office of Border Patrol 
is responsible for preventing illegal entry of people and contraband between the 
POEs. The Office of Field Operations has officers stationed at official POEs to 
protect the United States from the illegal entry of aliens, contraband and pests 
into the United States.  
A POE is an official term used to describe a legal point of entry between a 
foreign country and the United States. A POE can be an air, land or sea POE 
where passengers, crew and cargo arrive from abroad to the United States or 
depart the United States to a foreign destination. The United States has 327 
POEs (http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/). CBP officers working 
for the OFO are stationed at these POEs to inspect each passenger, item and 
conveyance that arrives to the United States. Historically, CBP has dedicated the 
majority of the OFO resources to inspecting those passengers and items arriving 
into the United States. However, a need exists to place a greater focus on the 
outbound environment on the SWB.  
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A. AUTHORITY FOR CBP TO CONDUCT OUTBOUND OPERATIONS AT 
THE LAND BORDER POES 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the legislative authority 
to perform outbound operations and interview individuals departing the United 
States. The Bank Secrecy Act and the Patriot Act authorize officers to question 
individuals departing the United States to determine if they have undeclared 
currency in excess of $10,000 in currency or monetary instruments, as long as 
the officer could articulate a border nexus (U.S. Customs, 2000, p. 1).  
Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that an 
immigration officer has the authority to question persons to determine alienage 
and his or her right to be or remain in the United States. In addition, section 110 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 
Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA) mandated the development and 
implementation of an automated entry/exit system that would record the entry 
and exit of every alien departing the Untied States. Later, Congress amended 
IIRIRA. Finally, section 711 of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act called for a biometric entry/exit system for Visa Waiver 
Program travelers at all POEs.  
Section 22 of United States Code, Section 401, allows for the seizure and 
detention of any arms or munitions and allows for the detention of any vessel, 
aircraft or vehicle expected of being used to export arms or munitions of war or 
other articles (22 USC 401). The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) is a 
regulation that lists commodities, specifications, and applicable license 
information for Commerce-controlled exports that CBP has the delegated 
authority to control and search for in the outbound environment. Pursuant to 22 
CFR 120.1, the President is authorized to control the export and import of 
defense articles and defense services. That authority has been delegated to the 
Secretary of State, is implemented through the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations ITAR, and is enforced primarily by CBP.  
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Title 21 Part 1300-1399 sets forth Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
regulations for export control. It contains a list of chemicals that may be exported 
only under certain legitimate circumstances, such as for medical, commercial, or 
scientific use. The DEA regulates the movement of precursor and essential 
chemicals that may be used in the manufacturer of controlled substances. CBP is 
the primary agency responsible for enforcing these regulations.  
Title 31 of United States Code sections 5316, 5317 and 5332 are the 
provisions for the exportation of currency outside of the United States. Under 31 
USC 5316, any person, or agent acting on the behalf of a person, must file a 
FINCEN 105 form if the intent is to export more than $10,000 in any form of U.S. 
or foreign currency and other negotiable instruments. This requirement to 
disclose information also applies to exports that have already occurred. To 
ensure compliance with the requirements of Section 5316, Section 5317 
authorizes  stop and search at the border and without a search warrant, of any 
vehicle, vessel, conveyance, envelope or container or person entering or 
departing the United States. Section 5332 makes it illegal for any person or agent 
of the person to attempt to evade the currency reporting requirements, as well as 
making it illegal for a person knowingly to conceal more than $10,000 and 
attempt to transport or transfer the currency or merchandise worth $10,000 or 
more outside the United States.  
Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations is a CBP regulation pertaining 
to the rules to exportation of self-propelled vehicles, vessels, and aircraft and the 
requirements for filing departure documents for items vehicles and conveyances 
and other items being exported from the United States.  
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) allows for officers to conduct warrantless searches 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause on the border of any person, 
article or conveyance arriving into or departing from the United States.  
The authorities listed above indicate that the CBP does have the authority 
and is actually mandated to develop and implement an outbound solution at the 
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air, land and sea POEs and that CBP has the right to look at vehicles and people 
departing the United States. Currently, no regulations are in place that require 
individuals or companies to transmit data on persons departing the United States 
via the SWB or any land border in the United States for that matter.  
B. CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS RELATING TO ENTRY/EXIT 
PROGRAMS IMPLEMENTED BY DHS THUS FAR AT THE POES  
The U.S. Visit and Immigrant Status Indicator Program (US-VISIT) was 
named under the Bush Administration as the program office responsible for 
implementing the automated biometric entry/exit program required under IIRIRA 
and DMIA (Seghetti, 2004, p. 1). The Congressional report on US-VISIT 
indicates that a significant amount of work has been done in the air environment 
on the entry of aliens into the United States that allows DHS to use information 
collected by US-VISIT as a risk assessment tool and track the entry and exit of 
many visitors to the United States (Seghetti, 2004, p. 23). However, the report 
outlines limitations of the automated system and implementation issues that US-
VISIT must overcome to move forward with a robust entry/exit solution (Seghetti, 
2004, pp. 23–28).  
In December 2006, the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) authored a report entitled “US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, 
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry.” This report 
noted that the US-VISIT program could not implement a biometric solution at the 
land POEs without causing a major impact on the land border POEs 
infrastructure with major traffic jams at the border. However, a non-biometric exit 
system at the land border POEs does not exists that identifies who or what is 
departing the United States.  
GAO had major concerns about DHS not possessing the capability to 
detect those persons who have overstayed their visas or period of admission and 
have not departed the United States. The report noted that some of September 
11, 2001 hijackers had overstayed their visas and were not apprehended (GAO, 
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p. 57, 2006). In addition, if CBP is not checking those vehicles and persons 
departing the United States, then CBP cannot accurately track who is departing 
the United States. Therefore, there are two issues: 1) the inability to track 
overstays accurately; and 2) the inability to determine who or what is departing. 
Therefore, a wanted criminal or terrorist could use the vulnerability of not having 
an outbound policy on the SWB and go undetected by CBP.  
In addition, it has been noted that the land borders are only collecting 
automated biometric entry information on certain individuals who require a permit 
to enter the United States. All other aliens entering the United States are not 
tracked upon departure in the land environment. The GAO states that DHS has 
delivered half of the automated biometric entry processing but exit capabilities do 
not exist (Hite, 2007, p. 1).  
The reports clearly demonstrate a gap in the security of the Untied States 
by not having an exit solution in place at the POEs. The vulnerability of not being 
able to determine who is departing the United States is clearly articulated in 
these reports. The documents do outline the strength of the automated entry 
process and the ability to identify potential criminals and terrorists or inadmissible 
aliens to the United States. The reports are silent on where the money would 
come from to develop an exit solution or what the exit solution should look like. 
However, the need for an exit strategy shines through each of the Congressional 
reports reviewed.  
C. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES FOR EXIT CONTROL 
A body of material was found on overseas policy for entry and exit. The 
European Union (EU), Israel and the United Kingdom (UK) practice some form of 
entry and exit control for persons entering and exiting their respective regions. 
Two documents were reviewed from the EU entitled: “The Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Entry/Exit 
System at the External Border of the European Union, Facilitation of Border 
Crossing for Bona Fide Travelers, and an Electronic Travel Authorization 
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System” and the “EU Schengen Catalogue.” Israeli information on entry/exit was 
outlined in the Department of State web pages on the entry/exit requirements, as 
well as an excerpt from the book entitled Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. 
The UK documents reviewed were the UK Border Agency Business Plan, the UK 
Border Agency Standard Operating Procedures, Detention at Ports, Enforcing 
the Rules: A Strategy to Ensure and Enforce Compliance with Our Immigration 
Laws and Securing the UK Border. 
All these documents outline the processes for each country in executing 
some form of an entry/exit solution. However, weaknesses exist with the EU exit 
procedures in that some of the countries in the EU or Schengen agreements do 
not have the infrastructure in place to conduct outbound operations (Kindler, 
2009, p. 2). In some instances, no infrastructure exists in EU countries to conduct 
exit inspections.  
The UK literature outlined the need to align their exit procedures with 
those of France and Belgium with whom they have trains entering and departing 
to the land environment. They also outline the need for technology in the border 
security environment. The documentation for the UK outlined a strong 
perspective for border control on both entry and exit (UK, 2007, p. 17). However, 
many initiatives for exit control in the UK are conceptual and have not been 
implemented.  
D. CURRENT DHS PROCESSES ON OUTBOUND ACTIVITIES 
A review of the literature on outbound activities on the SWB from 
components under DHS reveals that its legacy agencies have been performing 
outbound inspections for some time (Customs, 2000, p. 12). However, the 
documentation is outdated and a national policy does not exist since the 
establishment of CBP. The legacy agencies responsible for the POEs had 
different responsibilities and focuses prior to the development of DHS and no 
national policy exists that integrates the requirements of all legacy functions into 
a cohesive document for an exit solution on the SWB.  
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In summary, the relevant sources and materials identified provide various 
perspectives on entry/exit solutions. However, none of the documents reviewed 
outline a comprehensive approach for a national outbound strategy for the United 
States in the land border environment. The literature outlines the absence of an 
outbound strategy at the air, land and sea POEs and clearly identifies the need 
for an outbound policy but does not identify potential solutions nor does it outline 
the challenges that CBP will face should a national outbound policy be developed 
and implemented for the SWB. Finally, this review demonstrates the weaknesses 
in the security of the United States in not being able to determine who or what is 
departing via the SWB and the consequences associated with this vulnerability.  
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IV.  THREATS FROM DTOS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
POES  
In 2009, the Department of Justice declared in its annual Drug Threat 
Assessment that the Mexican DTOs are “the single greatest organized crime 
threat to the United States.” Like other criminal organizations, the Mexican DTOs 
are profit driven. The activities in which they are involved are mostly drug related 
but they do engage in other activities, such as the smuggling of humans into the 
United States, kidnapping, assassination and weapons and bulk cash smuggling 
out of the United States across the SWB. The same routes the DTOs use to 
move illegal aliens, narcotics and other items could be used for the entry or exit 
of terrorists wanted by the United States.  
This section outlines some of the illegal activities in which the Mexican 
DTOs are involved on the SWB, as well as indentify the threat that the bulk cash 
and weapons smuggling into Mexico causes.  
A.  DRUG TRAFFICKING 
The SWB region of the United States, which is considered for the 
purposes of this thesis to be the land borders in Arizona, California, New Mexico 
and Texas between the United States and Mexico, represents the principal 
arrival zone for illicit narcotics smuggled into United States (Finklea, 2010, p. 2). 
More illicit drugs are seized along the SWB than in any region. CBP officers at 
the POEs on the SWB process arriving vehicles and persons applying for entry 
into the United States. They have also been successful in identifying some of the 
narcotics attempting to be smuggled but not all.  
Mexican DTOs have developed sophisticated transportation networks 




significant quantities of illicit drugs, such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin and 
methamphetamines through and between the POEs along the SWB and store 
them in communities throughout the region.  
Most of the region's principal metropolitan areas, including Dallas, El 
Paso, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San Diego, are 
significant storage locations, as well as regional and national transportation and 
distribution centers. Mexican DTOs pay, bribe or force people, both U.S. and 
foreign citizens into bringing the drugs, on their person or in a conveyance, 
through the POEs on the SWB. The criminal groups or members of the Mexican 
DTOs transport drug shipments from load houses near the border area to 
destinations throughout the country for distribution to the American public (DOJ, 
2010, p. 2). The DTOs engage street gangs to sale their product in the United 
States. 
The following tables outline the amount of drugs seized on the SWB from 
2008 through 2010. The Office of Field Operations Drug Statistics worksheet that 
the Office of Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PPAE) provided these 
figures. PPAE is the office responsible for providing statistics on all OFO 
activities. The tables show the seizures on the SWB at the POEs only and do not 
account for any seizures made by the OBP in its area of responsibility. 
 
FY 2008 Drug Weight (Pounds) 
Field Office—SWB Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Meth 
EL PASO 167,570 764 3 3 
LAREDO 53,451 5,945 186 211 
SAN DIEGO 228,655 9,127 409 2,030 
TUCSON 70,805 3,420 286 316 
SWB Total 520,481 19,256 884 2,560 





FY 2009 Drug Weight (Pounds) 
Field Office—SWB Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Meth 
EL PASO 162.120 677 41 36 
LAREDO 99,491 5,964 193 644 
SAN DIEGO 279,121 8,017 617 3,648 
TUCSON 105,964 3,310 190 789 
SWB Total 646,696 19,968 1,041 5,060 
Table 3.   FY 2009 Drug Weight (Pounds) 
FY 2010 Drug Weight (Pounds) 
Field Office—SWB Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Meth 
EL PASO 82,831 618 58 147 
LAREDO 149,933 6,068 546 685 
SAN DIEGO 164,219 8,730 518 5,437 
TUCSON 119,348 3,300 264 789 
SWB Total 512,880 18,716 1,385 7,058 
Table 4.   FY 2010 Drug Weight (Pounds) 
Although an estimate does not exist on how many drugs move through 
and between the POEs undetected by CBP, DOJ estimates that several 
thousand metric tons pass through the POEs based of the amount of narcotics 
seized in 2009 (DOJ, 2010, p. 19).  
If an assumption is made that CBP only catches 25% of the narcotics that 
come through the POE, then the DTOs are still making more than enough money 
to sustain their operations and continue their illegal activities in both Mexico and 
the United States. For example, if the total number of marijuana seized in 2009 
was 646,696 pounds and a pound of marijuana at street value is at its lowest 
$2,500 dollars then CBP caught what would have been approximately $1.6 billion 
that the DTOs would have profited. However, the DTOs managed to transport 1.9 
billion pounds of marijuana through the POEs and the proceeds from the sale of 




Based off the same assumption, that CBP only catches 25% of the drugs 
being smuggled into the United States, using the 2010 totals and multiplying the 
current street value of the drugs based on the “San Diego and Imperial County 
Street Drugs Price List,” the following are the estimated proceeds the DTOs 
would have made in 2010: 
 1, 538,640 pounds of marijuana X $2500= $3,846,600,000 
 56,148 pounds of cocaine X $8000= $449,184,000 
 4,155 pounds of heroin X $8000= $12,465 
 21,174 pounds of methamphetamine X $15,000= 317,610,000 
The fact that DTOs made over $4 billion dollars selling drugs in the United 
States that went undetected and that CBP identified almost $30 million1 in bulk 
cash smuggling going south in 2010, indicates the amount of money undetected 
by CBP via the SWB is sufficient for the DTOs to continue to operate and thrive. 
To date, CBP has been unable to identify a sufficient amount of money that 
would cause a negative impact on the DTOs illegal activities. In addition, experts 
believe that the profits from the drug sales in the United States are much higher, 
ranging from $13.6 to $48.4 billion annually (Cook, 2007, p. 7). 
The threat of the DTOs caused by the illicit smuggling of narcotics into the 
United States daily threatens the officers working at the POEs. Although CBP 
uses every tool in its arsenal to detect and seize narcotics being smuggled by the 
DTOs into the POEs, it seems that the DTOs continue to transport narcotics to 
the POEs to be smuggled in and CBP cannot catch it all. In addition, some 
smugglers have previous criminal convictions or are wanted for a crime in the 
United States or Mexico. Some of these people are combative when encountered 
by CBP or attempt to run the port, which is dangerous not only to the officers but 
to all the traveling public at the POE and on the streets if CBP must pursue the 
vehicle.  
                                            
1 Internal National Summary Report from CBP/OFO that has not been released. 
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B. HUMAN SMUGGLING 
Since the Mexican DTOs are organized as criminal organizations, and are 
profit oriented, they have seen the benefits of smuggling humans into the United 
States using the same narcotic smuggling routes and methods. The SWB is a 
rich environment for those persons wishing to be smuggled into the United 
States.  
The Mexican DTOs control the market on selling documents to those who 
wish to attempt to enter the United States with an altered or counterfeit document 
or pose as an imposter with a genuine document to gain entry into the United 
States. The DTOs have a sophisticated smuggling system for human smuggling 
on the SWB and often use foot guides to guide aliens through the POEs on the 
SWB. Video footage retrieved on September 1, 2010 from the San Ysidro POE 
revealed that two-foot guides remained in the pedestrian facility for over an hour 
watching the lines that the CBP officers were manning and guided the imposters 
to an entry lane while diverting attention from the illegal aliens attempting entry. 
On that instance, only two out of a possible six aliens were selected for 
secondary inspection. The other four made it through the POE and were on the 
streets of the United States.  
The DTOs also engage in concealing people in trunks or non-factory 
compartments built into vehicles as the vehicles are attempting to enter the 
United States. On some occasions, the aliens are hidden in gas tank 
compartments welded shut and CBP must call the fire department to use the 
Jaws of Life or some other tool to extract the individual being smuggled safely. 
The DTOs have realized that human smuggling is profitable and continue to 
engage in this activity as another method of revenue. 
In 2009, the SWB POEs have administratively processed almost 52,000 
inadmissible aliens attempting to enter through the POEs.2 The apprehensions 
on the SWB at the POEs by CBP have made the smugglers desperate to move 
                                            
2 Internal Workload Enforcement Statistics, 2008 and 2009. 
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people northbound into the United States and take drastic measures that 
threaten the officers and the other travelers applying for admission into the 
United States. For example, on September 17, 2009, the San Ysidro POE had 
three large vans that ran through the primary lane at a high rate of speed to 
attempt to bypass CBP all together. The vans did not stop at the direction of CBP 
and officers had to jump out of the way of the van because it was not going to 
stop. The vans were trying to run over the officers. The vans were unsuccessful 
in their attempts to run the port; however, some of the smugglers and the aliens 
they were trying to smuggle incurred significant injuries. Seventy-nine illegal 
aliens were piled in the three vans that attempted to run the port.  
C. BORDER VIOLENCE 
President Felipe Calderon of Mexico made it a top priority to crack down 
on the Mexican DTOs when he took office in December of 2006 (Biettel, 2009, 
p.). President Calderon sent thousands of troops and police to combat the DTOs 
along the SWB and within the interior of Mexico. The crackdown on the Mexican 
drug cartels by the President of Mexico caused the escalation of violence 
between several cartels for the battle to control the multi-billion dollar drug trade 
and smuggling corridors to the United States (Biettel, 2009, p. 3). 
Although variances in the death tolls related to Mexican DTOs have 
occurred, deaths due to drug related violence have dramatically increased. Using 
the Mexican Attorney General’s statistics published in April 2009, 5,600 drug-
related deaths occurred in Mexico in 2008, which was a 110% increase over 
2007 (Beittel, 2009, p. 9). In the first two months of 2009, the violence escalated 
and there were almost 1,000 drug-related deaths. Compared to the same time in 
2008, this amounts to a 146% increase in drug-related killings (Beittel, 2009, p. 
10).  
The violence in Mexico has included assassinations of high-level 
government officials, federal, state and local law enforcement, military personnel 
and included gruesome murders and kidnappings. DEA reports indicate that the 
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crack down by President Calderon has led to the surge in violence by the DTOs 
(Beittel, 2009, p. 10). Violence is a tool of the drug trafficking industry and much 
of which is the result of the DTO conflict and control of territory to punish 
betrayals and inflict revenge on government and law enforcement successes. 
The DTOs also use violence to intimidate the public.  
Beheading of individuals and acid washing the bodies of their victims is 
not uncommon for the Mexican DTOs according to intelligence sources. Videos 
on “YouTube” can be found that show one of the Mexican DTO groups that 
kidnapped a rival cartel and beheaded him with a small knife. Another video of 
the Mexican DTOs violence shows a young boy blindfolded in his underwear on 
the floor while an adult male kicks and beats him repeatedly so that he will beg 
his family to raise the ransom demanded by the DTO.  
Border violence is an enduring threat for CBP frontline officers at the 
POEs and border patrol agents patrolling in between the ports. Violence directed 
at law enforcement officers along the SWB on the U.S. side, primarily CBP 
officers, often is intended to deter officers from seizing illicit drug shipments or as 
a diversion during drug, human or weapons smuggling operations. These 
incidents have increased over the past few years. For example, during FY 2008, 
1,325 incidents of violence occurred at and between the POE against CBP 
agents and officers, a 23% increase from FY 2007 reporting.3 Ninety-seven 
percent (97%) of all incidents of violence against CBP agents and officers 
happened on the SWB. During the first quarter of FY 2009, 327 incidents of 
violence occurred at and between the POE against CBP agents and officers. 
Ninety-nine percent (99%) of all incidents of violence in the first quarter of FY 
2009 occurred against CBP agents and officers on the SWB.4 
 
                                            
3 Unreleased information obtained from an internal CBP BorderStat system. 
4 Ibid. 
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The border violence that the Mexican DTOs participate in not only focuses 
on other DTOs and law enforcement officials in Mexico but Americans as well. 
For example, Lesley A. Enriquez, a U.S. Consular Officer and her husband, 
Arthur H. Redelfs, were murdered as they drove away from a birthday party in 
Ciudad Juarez on March 13, 2010. Both were U.S. citizens. The couple's infant 
daughter was found unharmed in the back seat. Mexican authorities arrested a 
Mexican national said to be the leader of a local street gang leader allied with the 
Juarez cartel (Los Angeles, July 2, 2010). He was mad because the Consular 
Officer issued a visa to one of the rival gang members so he murdered her. This 
same individual also admitted to killing 13 people in a shooting spree of a rival 
DTO party in January of the same year (Los Angeles, July 2, 2010). 
News article after news article tell of the DTOs path of destruction on 
anyone who gets in their way of making money by selling drugs, or encroaching 
on their territory. Many of the reporters in Mexico have been threatened and 
many killed by the DTOs for reporting the DTO violence in Mexico and the United 
States. On September 17, a newspaper photographer for El Diario de Juárez 
became the 11th journalist murdered in Mexico in 2010. An unidentified man 
gunned down Luis Carlos Santiago Orozco in his car, and another journalist, 
Carlos Sánchez Colunga, was shot and sent to the hospital in critical condition. 
The newspaper then wrote an open letter to the DTOs asking them what role 
their paper should play and how they should report the news because they did 
not want to have any more violence or murders of the employees of the paper 
(Phillip, 2009, p. 1). Some journalists have turned to social media for reporting 
because they can remain anonymous and DTOs cannot easily find them.  
In addition, the cartels post videos on You Tube that show beheadings 
and the beating of kidnapped victims. For example, one You Tube video in 
Spanish showed a DTO in black masks using a small knife to behead one of their 
rival DTO members. The DTOs stated this is what happened to those who 
interfered in their territory or their business. Another video showed a blindfolded 
young boy naked around the age of twelve being beaten by a man with a belt. 
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The attacker was also kicking the child with boots and punching the child while 
telling the child to plead to his parents to pay a ransom and provide information. 
Many photos also show the work of the cartel, such as numerous beheaded 
bodies hanging from bridges, people shot and killed in vehicles or their hands 
and face wrapped in tape with gun shot wounds that killed them with or without 
being tortured.  
The DTOs maintain a continuing threat of violence in Mexico. The struggle 
to control territory and intimidate the public, government officials and law 
enforcement continues with no indications that the violence will decline due to the 
rise in deaths and border violence over the past few years. The struggle between 
the DTOs to control smuggling routes to the United States and the prospects of 
violence perpetrated by the DTOs are most likely to happen on the SWB 
because most of the narcotics sent to the United States by the DTOs arrive on 
the SWB (Finklea, 2010, p. 2). In addition, those DTO members that enter 
through or between the POEs become a threat to society. DTOs do participate in 
other illicit activities, such as smuggling people, kidnapping, extortion, and other 
crimes for profit. For example, kidnappings in Phoenix rose to 267 and all were 
drug-related (Finklea, 2010, p. 10).  
D.  WEAPONS TRAFFICKING 
Weapons are strictly controlled in Mexico and the Mexican DTOs and their 
associated enforcement groups generally rely on firearms trafficking from the 
United States to Mexico. Mexican DTOs hire people to smuggle large and small 
quantities of firearms and ammunition from the United States to Mexico. The 
DTOs then use these weapons to defend their smuggling routes, eliminate rivals 
in other DTOs, control business dealings, control members, and challenge law 
enforcement.  
Historically,  illegally exported undeclared currency and weapons traveling 
outbound into Mexico are used by Mexican DTOs, which are responsible for a 
multitude of illicit activities and border violence that communities and law 
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enforcement face on a daily basis on the SWB (Napolitano, 2009). For example, 
Mexican officials have stated that the majority of the weapons that the DTOs are 
using come from the United States (Beittel, 2009, p. 12). Mexican officials 
estimate over 2,000 firearms are smuggled daily into the United States on the 
SWB. In addition, the ATF estimate that thousands of weapons are smuggled 
into Mexico every year (ATF, 2009). Many of these weapons are automatic 
weapons, such as AK-47 and AR-15 style assault rifles along with high caliber 
ammunition. In addition, some weapons seized by Mexican officials have been 
portable shoulder-fired anti- tank rockets and grenade launchers indicating that 
the DTOs have firepower to match military forces (ATF, 2009).  
In January 2007, over a 15-month period, ATF determined that 23 buyers 
had purchased 339 firearms in one store in Houston, Texas that were mostly 
semi-automatic rifles. Mexican authorities also had recovered 88 of these 
firearms in Mexico and several of the firearms were found at various crime 
scenes in Mexico where police had been murdered, judicial personnel had been 
executed, the military had received gunfire, or a businessman had been 
kidnapped and murdered. Members of a DTO purchased most of these weapons. 
In total, 18 Mexican law enforcement officers and civilians died using firearms 
purchased from this U.S. gun store (Goodman, 2010, p. 2). 
These weapons are arming the Mexican DTOs and are enabling them to 
combat local, state and federal law enforcement officers. President Calderon has 
urged President Obama to stop the flow of arms southbound into Mexico into the 
hands of the violent DTOs (Beittel, 2009, p. 12). The ability of the DTOs to have 
access to these weapons poses a threat to the United States. Mexico has 
experienced an estimated 28,000 drug-related deaths since 2006 (Finklea, 2010, 
p. 24). Most of these deaths involved some form of firearm. With this firepower, 
there is always the threat to the officers at the POEs that the DTOs are better 
equipped and could cause mass casualties to the officers and the traveling public 
if attacked.  
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E. BULK CASE SMUGGLING 
Bulk cash smuggling into Mexico is also an increasing issue that sustains 
Mexican DTO’s ability to continue their production and distribution of narcotics in 
Mexico and the United States. It also allows the DTOs to sustain or overpower 
local, state and federal law enforcement and military officers trying to combat the 
DTOs and the violence occurring in Mexico. Export regulations require persons 
to declare taking over $10,000 outside of the United States on a form called 
“FinCen105.” This form is used to track money moving into and out of the United 
States. The form requires the person declaring more than $10,000 to complete 
biographic information on themselves and the location where the money is going 
to assist U.S. officials in tracking money to try to identify those who fail to pay 
taxes, money laundering or other nefarious activities.  
As stated above, CBP is unable to determine how many narcotics and 
alien smuggling loads it misses at the POEs. However, using the assumption that 
CBP catches only 25% of what the DTOs pass through the POEs or between the 
POEs and using the street value of each individual narcotic and the weight, the 
assumption is that the DTOs are selling over $4 billon in the United States alone. 
These profits are then smuggled back into Mexico.  
The U.S. Patriot Act passed in 2009 made it more difficult for money 
laundering to take place in the United States and the DTOs resorted to 
smuggling bulk cash south into Mexico via the SWB. The DTOs have stash 
houses that bundle the money, seal it, and then hide the money in non-factory 
compartments, quarter panels, spare tires and other locations in the vehicles or 
on people that then travel from the United States into Mexico.  
To weaken the DTOs, the U.S. government and Mexico must cut off this 
cash flow. In doing so, it will be much harder for the DTOs to bribe people and 
sustain their drug making business. The officers at the POE need to have the 
capability to detect and seize profits intended for the DTOs. To disrupt a DTO,  
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the government must disrupt the flow of bulk cash. The POEs have only a limited 
ability and tools to do so in the environment in which they are working on the 
SWB. 
F.  CORRUPTION 
The Mexican DTOs also engage in the corruption of both U.S. and 
Mexican officials at all levels to assist in smuggling operations of both narcotics 
and people. The Mexican DTOs have been successful in corrupting law 
enforcement officials to accomplish their mission both on the Mexican and U.S. 
sides of the border. For example, on July 29, 2010, the Mexican military arrested 
62 local and state police officers in Tijuana with ties to DTOs who also took 
bribes for illicit activities. Allegations that over 100 corrupt officers are on the 
DTO payroll or are continuing to allow DTOs to operate in Tijuana alone, is a 
problem throughout Mexico where the DTOs operate (Goodsen, July 30, 2010).  
In addition, Mexican DTOs work at turning CBP officers at the POEs to 
allow them to pass narcotics or people through their lanes of traffic on the 
southwest border. In 2009, 19 CBP officials were arrested and convicted for 
performing illegal activities for gain.5 CBP displays these officers’ pictures with 
the crime committed and the penalty received on the CBP internal secure 
website for all officers to see to dissuade other officers from becoming corrupt. 
However, this is a continuing threat at the POEs on the SWB.  
To curb the ability of the DTOs to corrupt officials and the public on both 
sides of the border, the flow of bulk cash and weapons must be addressed. 
Without the money flow to bribe people and sustain the narcotics business, or the 
automatic weapons that the DTOs use to threaten people, the Mexican DTOs will 
be weakened and the effects of the DTOs will weaken as well.  
                                            
5 Internal CBP website “Trust Betrayed,” 2009. 
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G. NATIONAL STRATEGY  
Currently, CBP does not have a national strategy outlining the need for 
outbound inspections on the SWB. The risks above highlight some of the gaps in 
border security based of the actions of the Mexican DTOs. To address this 
increasing threat on the SWB accurately, CBP management needs to develop a 
nation strategy for combating the illicit activities and make outbound inspections 
on the SWB a national priority. CBP needs to identify what efforts are now 
occurring and their effectiveness against combating the DTOs, identify where 
CBP should be as an agency in terms of controlling the southbound traffic, and 
how to get where CBP should be to achieve the goals of strengthening the 
security of the United States by cutting off the flow of bulk cash and weapons 
currently returning to the DTOs (Bryson, 2004, pp. 6–9).  
Identifying where the outbound inspection on the SWB issue falls as a 
national priority for CBP and DHS is important to ascertain to develop a path 
ahead. If an outbound policy on the SWB is a priority for CBP, specific goals and 
objectives should be developed to address the threats of the Mexican DTOs 
operating on the SWB. Specific tactics need to be identified to address how to 
meet the goals and objectives outlined in a strategy. Key to being successful is 
the communication of the priority by CBP leadership to develop an outbound 
policy for the SWB. Another key communication will be to reach out to the 
stakeholders to message the “public value” to create public interest and drive 
community responsibility (Bryson, 2004, p. 8). Messaging to community 
stakeholders and travelers will be a key component in outlining CBP’s 
commitment to the mission of protecting the borders of the United States while 
continuing to expedite legitimate trade and travel both in the inbound 
environment for those applying for admission to the United States and for those 
departing the United States into Mexico.  
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Once an outbound policy on the SWB is identified as a national priority 
and placed in the national strategy for CBP, funding must be identified for 
whatever policy is to be implemented. A strategic plan for an outbound policy on 
the SWB should outline where the agency is now in terms of mission and 
mandates; the current systems currently in place with the personnel working 
outbound; what funding has been established for outbound teams; where the 
agency should be regarding what policy would work best on the SWB as far as 
policy options are concerned, and what plans need to be developed and 
accomplished to reach the end state of an effective SWB outbound policy. The 
plan should include staffing, infrastructure, personnel, information sharing and 
budget needs to implement a policy and accomplish the goals of detecting bulk 
cash and weapons smuggling on the SWB.  
Intelligence will be a key component in any plan developed for outbound 
inspections on the SWB. To disrupt the Mexican DTOs operating in CBP’s area 
of responsibility, CBP needs work with other agencies to determine the most up 
to date and critical information on the illicit activities in which the DTOs are 
involved. CBP at the highest levels needs to engage outside investigatory 
agencies to work out agreements that outline the need for information sharing to 
maximize the effectiveness of identifying bulk cash and weapons smuggling into 
Mexico.  
To be effective in the outbound environment on the SWB, CBP needs to 
collaborate with outside agencies and develop an overall strategy or model for 
information sharing that can be distributed to the field levels to increase the flow 
of information from investigatory agencies to CBP. For example, some outside 
agency cooperation and information with CBP/OFO is better in some field offices 
than others based on personality issues or willingness to share information. 
Without buy-in from the highest levels to the lowest levels on the need to share 
information and collaborate, CBP will not be as successful in increasing the 
amount of bulk cash and weapons seizures on the SWB and the DTOs will 
continue to thrive with their illicit drug trafficking activities and border violence.  
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The POEs remain vulnerable to organized and transnational criminal 
activity, as well as terrorist movements on the SWB. The United States has a 
comprehensive approach for preventing illegal contraband and aliens from 
entering the United States at the POEs yet little focus has been placed on who or 
what is departing the United States. Thus, the DTOs continue to smuggle 
automatic weapons and profits from their drug sales into Mexico via the 
southbound lanes of our POEs. A comprehensive approach must be taken to 
close this loophole.  
In addition to the free flow of weapons and bulk cash moving south, it is a 
possibility that terrorists wishing to depart the United States do so via the SWB. 
With the limited amount of outbound infrastructure, the lack of a national strategy 
or national policy to conduct outbound operations, the threat of terrorists moving 
undetected into Mexico via the SWB is a real one.  
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V.  POLICY OPTIONS 
A.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The Mexican DTOs continue to smuggle undeclared weapons and 
currency across the SWB fueling the border violence and allowing them to 
sustain their drug trafficking empire. CBP does not currently have a 
comprehensive outbound policy in place to address this threat. In addition, no 
way exists to ascertain who is departing the United States on the SWB, which is 
an avenue for those who are in an illegal immigration status, those wanted for a 
crime or a terrorist plotting against the United States could depart undetected via 
the SWB. Some ports of entry are currently conducting sporadic outbound 
inspections with little infrastructure with some results. However, it is not uniform 
across the SWB nor is there clear guidance in place on the priority for the officers 
conducting the outbound inspections. What policy option or options can be put in 
place that will mitigate this threat of weapons and currency moving southbound 
into Mexico undetected? 
B.  POLICY OPTIONS 
Several possible policy options are available for addressing this issue. 
They range from continuing the hit or miss status quo process of no national 
policy, to mirroring the inbound processing infrastructure solution for people and 
goods attempting to enter the United States, to a hybrid solution that would look 
at each site to determine the overall implementation of technology, personnel 
and infrastructure with intelligence sharing from internal and external agencies.  
1. Policy Option A—Status Quo 
This policy option would consist of continuing the current process for 
outbound inspections at each individual POE location on the SWB. The POEs 
currently performing outbound inspections on a regular basis would continue to 
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do so. Those POEs not currently performing outbound inspections would 
continue to focus on inbound traffic and not expand their outbound inspections 
activity. 
This policy option would not require additional resources or staff outside of 
what is already being used to conduct outbound operations and there would be 
no need for additional infrastructure or technology requirements from what is 
already in place. Many of the POEs on the SWB do not have any infrastructure or 
technology and under this option, there would be no requirement to place 
additional items in the outbound environment. The necessity to require property 
rights on state and local maintained roads that lead into Mexico from the United 
States would not be necessary. 
This policy option would not require additional training for officers at the 
POEs not currently performing outbound inspections and for those POEs 
conducting outbound operations. New officers can be trained with seasoned 
officers that have performed the duties of outbound inspections for vehicles and 
pedestrians traveling out of the United States into Mexico. 
Current agreements for information sharing would continue with outside 
agencies for information on possible targets of those persons or vehicles that 
might be carrying bulk cash or weapons into Mexico. Those POEs currently 
conducting outbound operations would continue to work at a local level to 
strengthen the ability to obtain advanced information on possible targets for the 
outbound teams to stop and inspect prior to that vehicle or pedestrian traveling 
into Mexico.  
2. Policy Option B—Mirror the Inbound 
This policy option would be to mirror the inbound processing infrastructure 
and the associated personnel and technology as the outbound inspection 
solution. Key to mirroring an inbound inspection process in the outbound 
environment would be the design and implementation of the infrastructure to 
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accommodate facilities for primary and secondary inspections on both vehicles 
and pedestrians departing to Mexico. In addition, the infrastructure to interview, 
search and detain vehicles and cars considered potential violators or subjects of 
interest to CBP would be required.  
At a minimum, the inbound infrastructure consists of the following for 
inbound processing at a non-commercial land border POE on the SWB. 
 Primary vehicle lanes 
 Primary pedestrian lanes 
 Vehicle secondary parking area 
 Vehicle secondary sitting area for passengers 
 Vehicle secondary processing area for case work 
 Pedestrian secondary waiting area 
 Pedestrian secondary processing area for case work 
 Detention cells  
 Parking structure for government and personal vehicles 
 Administrative offices 
 Bathrooms 
 Storage areas  
The technology would consist of the same technology included in the 
primary processing lanes and the secondary processing areas and offices. For 
example, each primary vehicle lane would have a license plate reader, an RFID 
reader, a radiation portal monitor, a camera that takes a picture of the driver, a 
computer for the officer to view the inspection results and query manually if 
needed, and a document machine reader. The technology in the secondary area 
would include computers for the officers to run queries and stationary and mobile 




The secondary and administrative offices would also have to include 
computers, telephones, document readers, and processing space for the officers 
to process both vehicle and pedestrian cases. Detention cells and holding areas 
would also have to be included in the outbound inspection solution under this 
option.  
To operate the outbound solution under this policy option, additional 
resources similar to the numbers that the POEs have for inbound processing 
would be necessary for this policy solution. If the POE were open 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, like many of the POEs on the SWB, the amount of staff for 
the outbound solution would need to be the same as for inbound processing to 
operate all operational outbound areas. 
3. Policy Option C—Hybrid  
The hybrid policy option for an outbound solution would rely on some 
technology, some infrastructure, additional officers, in addition to developing and 
implementing a robust intelligence-sharing system with other federal, state and 
local agencies.  
This approach would take the limitations of each SWB POE and determine 
how much infrastructure; technology and officers could be placed in the 
environment to maximize the effectiveness of recording vehicles and people 
departing the United States into Mexico and assist in identifying persons 
attempting to smuggle bulk cash and weapons into Mexico. The POE could 
determine the hours of operation for outbound inspections and could run 24 
hours or day, pulse and surge operations or for threat-based targets received 
from internal or external partners, or all three options in the hybrid policy option.  
The technology that would be put into place for the vehicle inspections 
would be contingent on the individual site but could consist of license plate 
readers on gantries that would capture vehicle license plates. The gantries 
should be strategically placed so that the information is collected in advance of 
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the CBP officer and can be sent to the CBP system that the CBP officers could 
monitor prior to the car reaching the inspection site. RFID technology similar to 
that in the inbound processing lanes could be placed if space permitted in 
addition to a camera that took a picture of the person in the vehicle.  
If there is space for a vehicle secondary area then mobile or stationary X-
Ray equipment could be used on the vehicle to detect any anomalies in the 
vehicle that indicate a potential for hidden bulk cash or weapons. Scopes for 
inspections on the vehicles, as well as busters to determine depth discrepancies, 
could also be used as tools for the officers to use in the secondary environment. 
Computers should be placed in the secondary area for case processing and in-
depth queries of the vehicles and people being questioned.  
The pedestrian infrastructure for the hybrid policy option would be again 
dependant on the space available at the POE and ability to expand. If some 
space were availabe, a pedestrian processing center or pedestrian lanes for 
officers to check documents and questions pedestrians on what they are 
exporting into Mexico could be built. Name queries could be done to maximize 
the ability for CBP to identify wanted or endangered persons, terrorists, previous 
violators of United States law or those persons attempting to smuggle bulk cash 
and weapons out of the United States. A secondary office with holding facilities 
and case processing and interview areas should also be included in the 
pedestrian work area to perform secondary inspections on cases referred from 
the primary inspection lanes.  
The technology for the pedestrian processing would consist of some 
computers, RFID readers, document machine readers, x-ray equipment for 
personal belongings, turnstiles for the pedestrians to pass through. The amount 
of equipment would be assessed during the site survey for each individual POE. 
Some technology, either mobile or stationary, is needed in the pedestrian 
environment to maximize the capability to identify possible threats exiting the 
United States. 
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To conduct the outbound inspections, each POE would require additional 
officers to staff the facility and conduct outbound inspections. The size of the 
facility built, the hours of operation and the technology deployed would determine 
the number of officers needed. The additional officers should be seasoned 
officers from either inbound processing or those currently working at a POE that 
conducts outbound inspections, but new officers should be hired for the inbound 
processing so as not to deplete the inbound processing staff. An assessment 
should be done to determine staffing needs for outbound similar to how it is done 
for inbound processing. Current staffing numbers for inbound processing should 
not sustain outbound operations. Outbound should be a priority with its own 
staffing model.  
Information sharing is critical in this policy option. CBP needs to work with 
federal, state and local law enforcement partners to identify potential targets that 
are likely to smuggle bulk cash and weapons south. For example, ATF has 
information on weapons being bought from local gun stores and could provide 
names and license plates to CBP to target those persons and vehicles if 
encountered traveling south through a POE possessing outbound processing 
capabilities. DEA could provide information on vehicles known to have traveled 
from the interior of the United States with bulk cash and are believed to be 
headed south into Mexico. With these targets, CBP can stop these vehicles if 
encountered and seize more money and weapons that would have gone into the 
hands of the DTOs. The information circle could then be closed by providing that 
information back to ATF and DEA on the targets that they provided. Working 
together in law enforcement with sustained enforcement and information-sharing 
efforts will prove fruitful, and at a minimum, shut off some of the flow of weapons 
and bulk cash returning to the DTOs.  
Each POE would be assessed in the outbound environment to determine 




 Infrastructure  
 Technology  
 Officers 
However, intelligence sharing both internally and externally would need to 
happen no matter how much technology, infrastructure or people are put into 
place to truly be effective in the outbound environment. The drive for intelligence 
sharing would have to come from the highest levels of DHS and CBP, and the 
other federal, state and local agencies.  
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VI.  POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge POE in Laredo, Texas and the San Ysidro POE 
in San Ysidro, California are two POEs that currently conduct outbound 
operations. Both locations have dedicated outbound teams and work pulse and 
surge operations, which means they work at different times and days of the week 
and neither are a 24/7 operation. Each POE has different infrastructures for the 
outbound inspections yet each have encountered bulk cash and weapons 
smuggling into Mexico.  
This analysis examines each location and analyzes how each policy 
option would improve the ability to detect bulk cash and weapons, how easy the 
option would be to implement at each location, the cost and how well the flow of 
traffic would be if each policy were implemented in each environment.  
A.  LINCOLN-JUAREZ BRIDGE POE 
The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge is a target-rich environment because it is 
geographically desirable for bulk cash smuggling from the United States into 
Mexico. The POE is nestled at the end of U.S. Interstate highway 35, which runs 
north straight into Chicago. Every major Interstate highway running east to west 
intersects with I-35.  
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Figure 1.   Lincoln-Juarez Outbound Inspections 
1. Policy Option A—Status Quo  
The city of Laredo owns the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge on which the POE is 
located for southbound traffic. Each vehicle entering Mexico must pay a toll. The 
street leading up to the outbound lanes is a city street with traffic lights on every 
block and signs that indicate federal officers are working.  
Currently, the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge has four outbound processing lanes. 
The lanes do not have booths for officers to stand in or technology to query 
vehicles or the people in the vehicle. License plate readers query the vehicle 
license plates and this information is transmitted to a computer in the secondary 
office area. If a vehicle is stolen, the officer in the secondary area can radio to the 
officers out on the lane or call out to them to stop the vehicle prior to it entering 
the toll plaza to pay the toll. A canopy covers the entire outbound inspection 
area. The POE has a small secondary office for searching and interviewing 
subjects referred from the primary vehicle lane and technology to query names of 
people and license plates.  
 47
One of the lanes can be blocked to use as a secondary area for searching 
vehicles or using the mobile X-ray van to screen the car to determine if any items 
are hidden in the vehicle. The x-ray van will show anomalies if there is a non-
factory built compartment, or anomalies throughout the vehicle. For example, 
some bulk cash smugglers use non-factory compartments to hide cash they are 
attempting to smuggle or spare tires or other parts of the vehicle hide the cash 
that cannot be detected by the naked eye. The port also has stationary x-ray 
equipment for x-raying personal belongings in the vehicle or on a person.  
The outbound team at the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge POE is led by a CBP, 
one supervisor, 14 CBP officers, two canine officers, one border patrol supervisor 
and 10 border patrol agents. The team works varying shifts to remain 
unpredictable. ICE also works on occasions with the outbound team to conduct 
inspections and to provide target information on those suspected of smuggling 
weapons and/or bulk cash into Mexico.  
The outbound team was provided targets for potential smugglers of bulk 
cash and weapons by ICE in 2009, which was very successful. For example, in 
2009, the outbound team in Laredo intercepted over $13 million in bulk cash 
attempting to be smuggled into Mexico. The team was also responsible for 11 
weapons seizures and thousands of rounds of ammunition prior to entry into 
Mexico. In 2010, the team had 12 weapons seizures with thousands of rounds of 
ammunition and seized over $5 million dollars in bulk cash attempting to go 
undeclared into Mexico.6  
Laredo management has made an effort to develop and train a dedicated 
outbound team to conduct inspections on the southbound lanes leading into 
Mexico. In doing so, the team has been the most successful of all of the SWB 
land POEs within CBP. The team has established procedures for targeting 
vehicles and people, and has been successful in finding some bulk cash and 
weapons in secondary interviews and searches of vehicles. The team has 
                                            
6 Seizure data from the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation within CBP from a local 
database not released in a public document.  
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worked with ICE to obtain intelligence on potential bulk cash and weapons 
smugglers but that free flow of information has not been sustained throughout 
2010.  
Under this policy option no changes to the current outbound team’s 
operations in Laredo would occur. No additional costs would be incurred by the 
port and no additional officers would be required. Intelligence gathering with 
outside agencies could be ongoing under this initiative to maximize productivity. 
The flow of traffic would be dependent on how often outbound inspections were 
initiated but the impact on traffic flowing into Mexico would be minimal. The wait 
time currently in the status quo is less than five minutes on average. However, 
the difference in the amount of bulk cash seized in 2009 has declined more than 
50% in 2010 when continuing with this model.  
2. Policy Option B—Mirror Inbound  
The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge is a 24/7 POE that processes privately owned 
vehicles only and does not process commercial or pedestrian traffic. The POE 
has 12 inbound lanes for processing vehicles attempting entry into the United 
States and a canopy covers all 12 lanes of traffic. Each lane is equipped with a 
booth where the officer stands to inspect the traffic. The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge 
does not process pedestrian traffic.  
There are 32 vehicle secondary parking spaces and a secondary office to 
perform secondary cases for those inadmissible to the United States are 
smuggling narcotics or other prohibited items or who require a permit to enter the 
United States, all of which would have to be replicated in the outbound 
environment.  
Technology would also have to implemented in the outbound environment 
to mirror the inbound infrastructure and processing. The inbound vehicle lanes 
are currently equipped with license plate readers for reading the front and rear 
license plates, RFID readers for RDIF-enabled documents, such as passport 
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cards or border crossing cards, scene cameras that capture the vehicle and the 
driver, and the radiation portal monitors. All of the underground wiring and 
electrical requirements would also have to installed or extended to the outbound 
environment for this technology to work.  
The booth in which the officer stands also contains technology to perform 
inspections. A computer containing all hit information is used along with a 
machine-readable zone scanner to query machine-readable documents not RFID 
enabled or is utilized for manual queries of CBP systems. Primary inspection 
booths also have phones that connect to the operations center and a port runner 
system to alert officers when a port runs through the booth without inspection. 
The secondary inspection area in Laredo for inbound processing currently 
has technology for the officers to use to perform secondary inspections, such as 
computers for querying vehicle, person and crossing history, as well as criminal 
history. In addition, x-ray equipment, busters that measure density, fiber optic 
scopes for looking into gas tanks and other spaces not easily reached and visible 
are employed.  
The “U.S. Land Port of Entry Design Supplement Guide.” authored by 
CBP. outlines the minimum requirements for the inbound physical infrastructure. 
At a minimum, the infrastructure that Laredo would need to implement in the 
outbound environment to mirror the inbound infrastructure would be the following.  
 1 Main Building for officers and administrative personnel  
 12 Primary Inspection Lanes 
 12 Primary Booths 
 1 Management Operation Center 
 32 Secondary Inspection Bays/Parking spaces 
 1 Secondary Building 
 1 Enclosed Secondary 
 1 Vehicle Lift 
 2 Secondary Booths  
 1 Short Stay Dog Kennel w/ individual kennels  
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 1 Impoundment Lot for seized vehicles 
 Parking Structure 
 2 Vaults for seized narcotics, money, merchandise and other 
articles 
Construction costs and costs to implement technology vary from state to 
state and by company. In addition, the landscape and environmental impacts 
vary from location to location. However, the costs of a fully equipped vehicle 
inspection lane are known to CBP, and can be used to demonstrate one portion 
of the costs and can be compared throughout the three policy options.  
A new fully equipped vehicle inspection lane costs $175,000 if more than 
four lanes are being put into a POE.7 The booth costs an additional $100,000. 
Thus, the total costs for one booth is $275,000.8 For Laredo to put in 12 new 
lanes, the costs for the lanes alone would be $3.3 million dollars.  
To operate in the outbound environment on a 24/7 basis, additional 
officers would have to be hired to conduct the outbound inspections. Generally, 
outbound inspections are conducted by seasoned CBP officers, who are now 
currently at the General Scale 12 (GS-12) while supervisors are at the General 
Scale 13 level (GS-13). The costs for CBP to maintain a GS-12 on a yearly basis 
with the salary, benefits and support is approximately $161,6459 and the costs to 
maintain a GS-13 supervisor in the same manner is $182,871 per year.10 
Although CBP will not release staffing numbers by location, it is estimated that 45 
people work each shift at the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge and a minimum of three 
shifts cover the 24/7 operating hours. At a minimum, the total number of officers 
that would have to be assigned to the outbound inspection facility that mirrors 
                                            
7 CBP estimate for a vehicle lane with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative technology 
installed to include front and back license plate reader, two cameras, RFID reader, computer, 
machine readable zone scanner, and telephone outlet. The costs come from an unreleased 
internal document. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Staffing costs internal to DHS, which include salary, benefits and support. 
10 Ibid. 
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inbound would be 135, of which 130 would be at the GS-12 level and five at the 
GS-13 level to supervise operations. Based on the costs listed above, the GS-12 
cost per year would be $21,013,850 and the GS-13 salaries would be $914,355 
for a total of $21,928,205 per year.  
A robust public outreach campaign to notify the public of the changes for 
vehicles traveling into Mexico would be required to transition from a pulse and 
surge operation with sporadic inspections with minimal staff into a full time 
outbound solution that mirrors inbound. Newspaper, radio and television ads 
would need to appear in both English and Spanish to notify the traveling public of 
the changes. Similar changes in processing and procedures occurred with the 
implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) and the 
outreach campaign for outbound would need to be similar to that campaign. 
WHTI spent $5.5 million for one year for outreach11 for the nation focusing on 
northern and southern land border areas. For the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge, the 
amount will be cut in half for cost estimating purposes since the Lincoln-Juarez 
Bridge is on the SWB; therefore, the costs of outreach would be approximately 
$2.75 million. 
The costs to mirror the inbound inspections in the outbound environment 
at the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge for the purposes of comparison would be 
$27,978,205.12 This figure is not meant to be all encompassing since the true 
costs to mirror the inbound inspection in the outbound environment would be 
much higher because CBP would have to hire a contractor to develop and design 
the outbound inspection area, build each building that the inbound environment 
has, run cable and wiring for the technology, buy the equipment, do 
environmental assessments, and purchase the property rights and the property. 
However, it does provide a cost for this thesis to compare. 
                                            
11 WHTI outreach cost spreadsheet. 
12 $21,928,205 for staffing plus $3,300,000 for lanes plus $2,750,000 for 
outreach=$27,978,205. 
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In looking at this policy option, there are both pros and cons to 
implementation. The costs identified in this thesis are partial costs only and real 
costs for any location would still have to be identified. However, if implemented, 
CBP would benefit because each vehicle traveling through the southbound lanes 
of the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge could be examined and a determination made as to 
whether a secondary inspection was warranted.  
Based on referral rates of the inbound processing, less than 2% of the 
total inbound traffic is referred for secondary inspection. Statistical data from the 
Laredo Bridge System states that 3,381,080 vehicles departed through the 
Lincoln-Juarez Bridge in 2009.13 Using the same referral rate from inbound 
processing in the outbound environment would mean that 67,621 cars would be 
referred for secondary inspection annually, 5,635 monthly and 187 cars daily. Of 
the 187 cars referred, less than one car every two days would be likely contain 
have undeclared bulk cash or weapons. It is impossible to determine the amount 
of bulk cash and weapons that CBP would seize. However, an assumption can 
be made that CBP would be more successful than in 2010 and would increase by 
100% in the amount of money and weapons found under this solution. In this 
instance, the amount of cash seized would be $10 million and the number of 
weapon seizures would increase from 12 to 24.  
The city streets leading up to the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge would be backed 
up for miles and not only affect the city traffic but the traffic on Interstate 35, 
which is a major interstate that runs throughout Texas. The public perception of 
waiting in this traffic would be negative and the city businesses in Laredo would 
also probably complain that business would decrease if this option were to be 
implemented due to congestion and the inability for vehicles and people to move 
freely through Laredo to visit local businesses and south into Mexico after 
shopping or visiting Laredo. For this policy option, the free flow of traffic would be 
very low due to the congestion that the new outbound inspection would cause if 
                                            
13 City of Laredo, Laredo Bridge System, Statistical Data-Fiscal Year 2009, Traffic 
Distribution Worksheet. 
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implemented. It is also likely that travelers would divert to other bridges in the 
Laredo area to depart the United States into Mexico. It is anticipated that wait 
times for the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge would rise to over 60 minutes if implemented 
similar to that of the inbound traffic but with added time due to the fact that cars 
proceed through a toll booth and pay a toll prior to entering into Mexico.  
The ability to buy the rights to any additional land to build an outbound 
inspection would have to be requested from the City of Laredo because they own 
the property rights and the bridges in Laredo that lead into Mexico. It is unlikely 
that the City of Laredo would be willing to sale any property rights or land for 
CBP to construct an outbound inspection area mirroring the inbound. In addition, 
it would be very difficult to expand the bridges and roadway approaching the 
southbound lanes into Mexico because of the close proximity of residential 
subdivisions and not very much land exists in between.  
The funding for a new outbound facility that mirrors the inbound inspection 
for the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge currently not appear in any upcoming budget 
cycles. CBP would have to develop budget estimates and costs and develop a 
budget proposal for the FY12 or later budget cycle for Congress to appropriate 
funding for this facility upgrade and all costs associated with development of 
outbound processing that mirrors the inbound processing.  
The time it would take to implement this policy option would be dependent 
upon securing funding, the hiring, training, or moving people to work at the port 
and the time it takes to acquire and build the facility assuming that the land could 
be purchased. Also considered is the time it takes to develop and secure the 
budget, as well the time needed for development and implementation. In this 
case, it does not look feasible; thus, the ease of implementation for this policy 
option is very difficult.  
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3. Policy Option C—Hybrid Solution  
The hybrid solution for the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge would consist of a site 
visit to determine what, if any, infrastructure is needed in the southbound lanes 
into Mexico, what technology is currently available and what can be bought and 
implemented within the footprint of the southbound environment. Also, it is 
necessary to know how many people would be required in addition to who is 
already available. Also important is an agreement with internal and external 
stakeholders on information and intelligence sharing to develop actionable 
targets for bulk cash and weapons smuggling into Mexico.  
A full site survey should be completed at each location to realize what can 
and cannot be done in the current environment and landscape at each POE. It 
may be possible to obtain property rights in some locations and southbound 
operations extended to develop and deploy some infrastructure, technology and 
personnel while working on the relationships to build the information and 
intelligence sharing information between agencies.  
The Lincoln- Juarez Bridge has four outbound lanes that lead into several 
toll booth lanes to depart the United States into Mexico. A canopy covers all the 
lanes and an office currently is used to monitor one computer in the secondary 
environment. These lanes are currently not equipped with valuable technology 
that would assist the officers in detecting potential targets. A stationary x-ray 
machine is used to x-ray personal belongings and the POE also has a mobile x-
ray van for vehicles if space is available.  
In the hybrid solution, the four lanes would be re-built to have a fully 
functional vehicle lane that costs $275,000. These lanes would have the same 
equipment in them as previously mentioned in Policy Option B. The total costs for 
these four lanes would be $1,100,000. The current secondary office would also 
be upgraded to include more computers and secondary processing equipment, 
which will not be included in the cost estimate for this thesis.  
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The outbound team at the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge POE has one CBP/OFO 
supervisor, 14 CBP officers, two canine officers, one border patrol supervisor and 
10 border patrol agents. The team works varying shifts and days off to remain 
unpredictable. The team is able to cover about two shifts but often works other 
bridges. In the hybrid policy option, the recommendation would be to augment 
the current staffing levels and place an additional 14 CBP officers at the GS-12 
level and two supervisors at the GS-13 level and create three shifts to cover a 
24-hour period or pulse and surge operations working overlapping shifts based 
on target and threat information.  
The costs of the additional personnel for the 14 GS-12 officers would be 
$2,263,030. The costs for the two GS-13 supervisors would be $365,742 for a 
total of $2,628,772 for personnel for the hybrid solution.  
The team currently works outbound operations but with the 
implementation of new technology, people and equipment, a campaign outlining 
the fact that upgrades to the outbound processing are being improved would be 
recommended. The amount of outreach would not have to be as extensive as 
mirroring the inbound solution and could be a third of the cost. Thus, the cost of 
the outreach campaign to notify the public would be $916,666.14 
In this option, intelligence would be a key factor. The more intelligence 
sharing between CBP and other federal, state and local entities, the more 
successful CBP will be in identifying bulk cask and weapons smuggling out of the 
United States. Assuming that the Department of Homeland Security at the 
highest levels has worked internally to mandate that our own investigatory 
agency, as well as other federal agencies, share target information with CBP on 
people and vehicles known or suspected of being involved in bulk cash or 
weapons smuggling, then the amount of interceptions would increase. CBP could 
work locally with state and local law enforcement entities to receive target 
information on those known to local law enforcement.  
                                            
14 $2,750,000 for Policy Option B was divided by 3 to get 916,666. This was done because 
there were 12 lanes in Option B and only four in Option C so 12 lanes divided by 4 lanes = 3. 
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This solution has pros and cons as well. With this option, it is not possible 
to inspect each vehicle exiting into Mexico. However, the ability would exist to 
capture all of the license plates departing the United States electronically for 
future targeting purposes. Officers would still not be able to cover 24/7 operations 
due to days off and annual and sick leave. However, the teams could cover two 
shifts a day five times a week.  
Statistics on how many more targets is difficult to estimate. However, the 
amount of seizures and money decreased by 50% when the amount of 
intelligence given by other federal, state and local agencies halted. Thus, for the 
purposes of this thesis, the assumption will be made that if a robust intelligence-
gathering model is put into place, then the number of seizures and/or amount of 
money seized will increase by 50 percent. For example, in 2009, the Lincoln-
Juarez Bridge seized approximately $5,000,000. Under the hybrid solution, once 
the intelligence-sharing module was implemented, an increase of $2,500,000 
would be expected the following year for a total of $7,500,000. The amount of 
weapons would also increase based on intelligence by offices, such as ICE and 
ATF. 
The ease of implementation would not be that difficult because the 
solution is using infrastructure already in place. Therefore, property rights would 
not have to be addressed since CBP already owns or leases this area and works 
there year round. In addition, the flow of traffic would be minimally impacted. 
Currently officers stand on four lanes and ask questions to the traveling public. 
This option would have minimal impact and only cause minimal delays at peak 
traffic times; therefore, the public perception of this option should be medium to 
high since the solution would minimize the impact on traffic flow onto the bridge 
into Mexico. The time it would take to implement this option would be the amount 
of time to secure the funding and hire or move people to Laredo. The total costs 
for this option based on the same criteria used in the other options would be 
$4,645,438.  
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B.  SAN YSIDRO POE 
The San Ysidro POE is located in San Ysidro, California and runs 
northbound into Interstate 805 or Interstate 5. For those traveling south into 
Mexico in a vehicle, Interstate 5 leads into Mexico. San Ysidro is desirable to 
bulk cash and weapons smugglers into Mexico because of the sheer volume of 
vehicles traveling out of the United States into Mexico and since it is located on a 
busy interstate with speeds reaching 75 miles per hour. In addition, CBP seizes 
thousands of pounds of narcotics each year at the San Ysidro POE.  
 
 
Figure 2.   San Ysidro Outbound Operations 
1. Policy Option A—Status Quo 
San Ysidro POE processes both vehicles and pedestrians departing the 
United States into Mexico. A sidewalk that leads directly to the turnstile to enter 
Mexico is to be inspected by Mexican officials. There is no facility or 
infrastructure for CBP to stand in for the pedestrian inspections and no 
secondary area exists for processing those who are believed to have violated 
federal or state law. Officers stand on the sidewalk, inspect the pedestrians and  
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ask for declarations of what they are exporting into Mexico if anything. They also 
ask the pedestrians if they are carrying over $10,000 in currency or merchandise 
into Mexico.  
Officers at the San Ysidro POE also conduct vehicles inspections on 
Interstate 5. Officers must set up the freeway with CBP vehicles to block some of 
the lanes so the traffic is funneled from six lanes down to three so that the traffic 
will slow down. Officer safety is a critical element in this environment since the 
cars can travel over 75 miles per hour making this a very dangerous situation for 
the officers. Cement blocks called K-rails divide the lanes at one point of the 
freeway to assist the officers in slowing down traffic with the vehicles and some 
antiquated license plate readers read the plates on the vehicles. The information 
is transmitted to a computer at the U-turn, which is far from the initial inspection 
of the vehicles. There is no booth for the officer to stand in to be protected or 
shielded from the vehicles.  
The officers pull the vehicles over to the side of the freeway where the 
cars are blocking the lanes to inspect the vehicle and the drivers more 
thoroughly. No real secondary area exists but the officers have the cars to the 
side of the freeway and they use busters to look for anomalies in the vehicle 
structure. At the same time, they are questioning the occupants to determine if 
something is concealed in the vehicle or on the person. Although there is not 
much space to inspect the vehicles, the team has tried to use the mobile x-ray 
equipment to inspect some of the vehicles referred to secondary. In addition, 
operations have occurred in which mobile x-ray has been used for pedestrian’s 
belongings.  
If a pedestrian or a vehicle is believed to be involved in illegal activity, the 
officers must transport the person and/or the vehicle back to the POE. The 
outbound team does not currently have transport vehicles so its walks the 




the vehicle secondary area to conduct x-rays and inspections. The pedestrians, 
drivers or passengers are taken to the security officer for an immediate pat down 
for officer safety and are then interviewed.  
The San Ysidro POE has a team of 22 officers and two supervisors that 
currently work the outbound environment. The teams cover two shifts about five 
or six days a week depending on the days off and shifts of the team. The teams 
currently work pulse and surge operations and try and stay unpredictable to 
maximize effectiveness. The 6-lane interstate makes the outbound team’s job 
very difficult and dangerous due to the high rate of speed and the number of cars 
departing the United States into Mexico.  
On occasions, ICE agents will work with the outbound team but little 
information is shared with CBP in San Ysidro. However, when information is 
shared, the results are good. For example, ICE received data from an external 
law enforcement agency that a vehicle had concealed high-powered weapons in 
it and they provided that information to CBP. The outbound team was able to get 
on the freeway and stop the vehicle.  Eight automatic weapons with ammunition 
were seized that were bound for Mexico and most likely DTOs.  
In 2009, the San Ysidro outbound team seized approximately $1,300,000 
and had one weapon seizure during the 2010 timeframe.15 The team continues 
to work in both the pedestrian and vehicle environments to maximize the ability to 
detect and stop potential bulk cash and weapons smugglers. The outbound team 
also looks for those wanted for crimes in the United States to stop those wanted 
persons from exiting the United States into Mexico.  
Management at the San Ysidro POE has taken officers from the inbound 
processing and placed them in the outbound environment in an attempt to 
identify bulk cash and weapons being smuggled into Mexico. The team has been 
given some training to maximize their effectiveness. However, the conditions are 
                                            
15 Stats from the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation within CBP ran through a local 
system and not released publicly.  
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dangerous with the set up on an Interstate that allows speeds of over 75 miles 
per hour. The team has been successful in seizing some bulk cash and 
weapons, as well as in identifying stolen vehicles and those persons wanted for a 
crime by other federal, state and local agencies.  
Under this policy option, no additional costs would be incurred to continue 
outbound inspections in the manner currently being done. The flow of traffic will 
depend on how often inspections are conducted and certain times of the day that 
traffic is backed up even if the outbound team is not on the freeway. Pedestrian 
traffic is not really affected by outbound processing by CBP. The number of 
seizures will continue to improve as the team obtains better information from ICE 
or external agencies and as the targeting for outbound improves.  
2. Policy Option B—Mirror Inbound Processing 
The San Ysidro POE is a 24/7 POE that processes non-commercial 
vehicles and pedestrians making entry into the United States. The San Ysidro 
POE has 24 vehicle lanes of traffic with booths in each lane. The pedestrian 
facility has 13 working pedestrian lanes and a pedestrian. The vehicle secondary 
has over 60-vehicle secondary parking bays and has a security office for the 
people with cell phones and three super booths for officers to run queries in for 
the vehicles and their owners. The pedestrians have a secondary area to screen 
those referred. There is an immigration processing area for both pedestrians and 
vehicles for those considered inadmissible to the United States 
The inbound vehicle lanes are currently equipped with license plate 
readers for reading the front and rear license plates, RFID readers for RDIF 
enabled documents, such as passport cards or border crossing cards, scene 
cameras that capture the vehicle and the driver, and the radiation portal 
monitors. All of the underground wiring and electrical requirements would also 
have to be installed or extended to the outbound environment to make this 
technology work.  
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The booth that the officer stands in also has technology to perform 
inspections. A computer containing all hit information is used along with a 
machine-readable zone scanner to query machine-readable documents not RFID 
enabled or is utilized for manual queries of CBP systems. Primary inspection 
booths also have phones that connect to the operations center and a port runner 
system to alert officers when a port runs through the booth without inspection. All 
of this would need to be replicated in the four outbound environment.  
San Ysidro would need to purchase the property rights to the land 
adjacent to the POE and build 24 vehicle lanes fully equipped with the same 
technology that the inbound lanes have. The cost of a lane with the technology in 
place is approximately $275,000 per lane. The cost for the lanes would be 
$6,600,000 using the same information used in the Laredo example. These costs 
do not include the pedestrian costs for lanes. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
costs used for the lanes will only include the vehicles lanes for comparison. Other 
costs are associated with the infrastructure of mirroring the inbound and these 
estimates are only used for comparison costs between the policy options.  
The number of officers working at the San Ysidro POE to cover a 24/7 
period at the officer level is 560 officers and there are 65 first line supervisors. In 
order to replicate staffing levels in the outbound environment, the GS-12 officer 
level would cost $ 50,521,200. The GS-13 level supervisory costs would be 
$11,886,615 for a total of 62,407,815 annually for outbound operations mirroring 
the inbound operations.  
Outreach to notify the public would need to occur to ensure awareness of 
the new processes and procedures to be implemented. As stated in the Laredo 
example, the number for the SWB would be $2.75 million just for costs estimates. 
Therefore, the total for the San Ysidro POE to mirror the inbound processing 
would be $71,757,815. The recurring officer costs would continue and operations 
and maintenance costs for the lanes and technology would recur. 
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The number of cars that entered the San Ysidro POE in 2009 was 
approximately 13.5 million vehicles. Of those cars, less than 2% are referred to 
secondary inspection. Based off the Laredo figure that 72% of the inbound traffic 
coming into the United States left through the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge, the same 
percentage used in San Ysidro would mean that 9,720,000 would be departing 
into Mexico via the San Ysidro POE. Thus, 194,400 cars would be referred to 
secondary in the outbound environment annually, while 16,200 cars would be 
referred monthly or roughly 540 a day, and most for administrative purposes. In 
this policy option, an assumption could be made that a 100% increase would 
occur in what CBP identified in the outbound operations. Thus, the CBP 
outbound team under this option would seize $2,600,000 and make more than 
two weapons seizures.  
This policy option would allow CBP to look at each car and possibly talk to 
each person departing the United States. The information from the technology in 
place would benefit CBP in determining what vehicles are exiting the United 
States and potentially what people are departing the United States. The more 
cars and people examined would cause one to think that more apprehensions 
and seizures would be made.  
However, the implementation of 24 vehicles lanes of traffic would back up 
traffic for miles both on Interstates 5 and 805 for those cars merging into the five 
lanes to enter Mexico. The public would notice a difference in the traffic wait 
times. Inbound wait times on the 24 lanes of traffic vary from 20 minutes at low 
times and almost two hours at peak times whereas now the wait times are 
minimal.  
San Ysidro is currently under going construction and has already 
purchased some of the land to extend the POE to conduct outbound operations. 
However, under this policy option, CBP would have to purchase additional land, 
which may not be available. The time it would take to implement this option 
would be dependent upon securing funding, hiring, training, or moving people to 
work at the port and the time it takes to acquire and build the facility assuming 
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that the land could be purchased. Based on the time it takes to develop and 
secure the budget, and the time for development and implementation, the ease 
of implementation for this policy option is very difficult.  
3. Policy Option C—Hybrid Solution 
The hybrid solution for the San Ysidro POE would consist of a site visit to 
determine what if any infrastructure exists in the outbound lanes leading into 
Mexico, what technology exists and what can be bought, updated or built within 
the footprint of available space. In addition, an assessment of how many people 
would be needed would have to be determined and recommended to establish a 
robust outbound inspections process. An evaluation of the intelligence sharing 
between CBP and other federal, state and local law enforcement entities should 
also be accomplished to build a foundation for sharing actionable intelligence for 
CBP to act upon in the outbound environment to be effective. A team should 
conduct a full site survey to identify what can and cannot be done in the San 
Ysidro environment since it is on a very busy interstate and there is limited space 
to work with in the southbound environment.  
The San Ysidro POE has six southbound lanes that go into Mexico. There 
are cement barriers that run separate from the lanes at one point in the freeway 
so that the officers have some cover and to slow down traffic. These lanes do not 
possess technology for the officers to use to alert them that a potential target 
exists to whom they are talking. Any information would be gathered from the old 
license plate readers. The information from these readers goes into the U-turn 
booth located far away from the inspection site and the officers depend on radio 
communication to alert them of a computer-generated hit on a vehicle.  
In the pedestrian environment, no infrastructure exists at all to slow people 
down or to query their documents and/or names and dates of birth. There is no 
canopy over the sidewalk leading into Mexico where the pedestrians walk, and 
neither is there one for the vehicles lanes of traffic.  
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The San Ysidro POE does not have any space dedicated to secondary 
referrals. In fact, the team places cars in the far left lanes to use in processing 
vehicles pulled over for additional questioning. A vehicle secondary area would 
be needed for the officers to refer vehicles to for inspection with or without x-ray 
equipment. Both primary and secondary pedestrian facilities would need to be 
built and technology installed to inspect individuals departing the United States 
into Mexico properly.  
In this solution, the six lanes currently on Interstate 5 for traffic would be 
built to include all the technology available in the vehicle primary booth. These 
lanes would be equipped with the same equipment as mentioned in Policy option 
B and the price is the same per land at $275,000. The license plate readers 
could be placed in a location to query as soon as the car is in the lane and the 
officer would have that information waiting at a booth prior to the arrival of the 
vehicle. The costs for the lanes would be $1,650,000. This number does not 
account for any of the pedestrian facilities or secondary processing facilities or 
equipment needed to accomplish a hybrid approach. However, it is an equal 
comparison using the lane cost only. 
Currently, two teams work outbound inspections with 22 officers and two 
supervisors. The teams usually work different shifts but can only cover one area, 
either vehicle or pedestrian, since the freeway is dangerous with little to no 
infrastructure. To support a 24/7 operation in the vehicle and pedestrian 
environments for outbound operations, an additional 66 officers16 at the GS-12 
level and an additional siz supervisors at the GS-13 level would be required. The 
costs for personnel to accommodate the hybrid solution would be $10,668,570 
for the GS-12 personnel and $1,097,226 for the GS-13 supervisors for a total of 
$11,765,796 annually. The personnel should be brought from the outside, or at a 
minimum, if taken from inbound processing, those officers should be backfilled.  
                                            
16 Twenty-two officers on each shift to cover two additional shifts and days off for 24/7 
coverage. 
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To move to a more robust outbound inspection process, CBP would need 
to educate the public on the new process. CBP would also need to deploy signs 
in English and Spanish to inform the public that are officers working outbound so 
that cars would slow down. As previously stated, WHTI launched a similar 
outreach campaign to the public that required $5.5 million for advertising and 
informing the public that new procedures were in place for both the SWB and the 
northern border, the costs for the SWB would be $2.75 million. Using the same 
formula used for Laredo, this number would be divided by 2 since there are six 
lanes proposed in the hybrid solution. Thus, the costs for outreach for the San 
Ysidro area would be $1,375,000.  
In this option, intelligence would be a key factor. The more intelligence 
sharing between CBP and other federal, state and local entities, the more 
successful CBP will be in identifying bulk cash and weapons smuggling out of the 
United States. Assuming that the Department of Homeland Security at the 
highest levels has worked internally to mandate that our own investigatory 
agency, as well as other federal agencies, share target information with CBP on 
people and vehicles known or suspected of being involved in bulk cash or 
weapons smuggling, then the amount of interceptions would increase. CBP could 
work locally with state and local law enforcement entities to receive target 
information on those known to local law enforcement. Historically, intelligence 
information sharing from outside entities has been limited.  
In this option, officers could use the technology and target those who they 
wanted to stop and question or they could stop and speak with each vehicle 
attempting to depart the United States. The same is true for the pedestrian 
environment. The technology that would be installed would capture license plate 
data whether the officer chose to speak to the person in the vehicle or not and 
would provide CBP with critical data for intelligence purposes.  
Statistics are difficult to predict. However, with this solution, the officers 
would be looking at more people and obtaining more advance information. Thus, 
an assumption could be made that seizures would increase 50% annually. San 
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Ysidro seized almost $2 million dollars from 166 different seizures in FY10.17 
Consequently, using the assumption that a 50% increase would occur means 
there would be 332 seizures and almost $3 million in bulk currency. In FY10, 
there were two weapons seizures. Therefore, there would be at least three 
weapons seizures and the numbers would grow with the intelligence-sharing 
protocols put into place.  
For San Ysidro, the implementation of the hybrid solution would take some 
work since little to no infrastructure exists. However, the government already 
owns the land through which the six lanes of freeway pass. CBP would have to 
acquire the money for the development and design of the expansion and the 
technology it needed for these lanes and the other offices and areas required for 
this solution. The flow of traffic would potentially slow down a little but CBP could 
monitor the wait times and keep them under 15 minutes, which is much less than 
Policy Option B. In addition, the time it takes to implement this solution would be 
the time it takes to hire the personnel, develop and design the facility, acquire 
budgeting, educate the public, and finish construction of the project. The total for 
this hybrid solution using the lane costs, personnel and the outreach costs would 
be $14,790,796 compared to the $71,757,815 costs for Policy Option B.  
C. ANALYSIS 
In looking at both the Lincoln-Juarez and San Ysidro POEs, it is apparent 
that both have very different footprints or infrastructure. Continuing with the 
status quo under Policy Option A will not maximize the ability of CBP to identify 
and seize bulk cash or weapons intended for the DTOs at either location. The 
implementation of Policy Option B at both POEs would increase the amount of 
bulk cash and weapons seized by looking at more cars and people but at a 
significant cost monetarily and to the free flow of traffic. The wait times for the 
San Ysidro POE if mirroring the inbound wait times could reach over two hours 
into Mexico, which would affect all traffic and trade in the San Diego area. The 
                                            
17 Local statistical data from the San Ysidro POE that will not be released. 
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Lincoln-Juarez Bridge, although on a city street, leads straight to Interstate 34, 
which if Policy Option B were implemented, would significantly back up traffic 
throughout the Laredo area as well. The loss of trade and low public perception 
due to the wait times and the costs are inhibitors to implementing Policy Option 
B.  
In both locations, space issues occur as well. No additional space to 
extend the footprint of the port to twelve lanes exists around the Lincoln-Juarez 
Bridge, and the City of Laredo owns that bridge and is unlikely to sale what little 
property is available and relinquish its ability to make money. Each location 
would have to overcome multiple barriers to implement this option to include the 
following. 
 Securing funding for construction 
 Securing funding for property rights 
 Securing funding for personnel 
 Hiring personnel 
 Training personnel 
 Hiring design and construction company 
 Execute environmental assessments 
 Securing funding for outreach activities 
 Time it takes to complete construction 
Although it is assumed that a 100% increase in seizures in both locations 
would occur, the high costs, difficulty of implementing such a policy and the poor 
flow of traffic, would not make Policy Option B a good option to implement.  
Policy Option C is the best possible option for CBP to implement. It gives 
CBP leverage in looking at each individual location to determine exactly what 
infrastructure and technology could be installed based on the individual footprint 
of the POE. A determination of the amount of personnel needed would depend 
on the amount of infrastructure installed. Although a slight increase in traffic wait 
times might occur at peak travel time, this option would not adversely affect the 
commerce or public, and therefore, the perception would be good.  
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Policy Option C does require that CBP secure funding for this initiative. 
Congress is more likely to fund this hybrid solution based on CBP maximizing the 
space available in the current footprint of the POE and identifying the benefits of 
a 50% increase in the first year after the POE is operational. It is expected that 
as the officers become more familiar with the outbound environment, the number 
of weapons seizures and the amount of bulk cash identified may increase.  
A key component of Policy Option C is the intelligence sharing between 
agencies. DHS, at the highest level, needs to engage federal, state and local 
agencies to open a free flow of intelligence between agencies to be effective. 
Agencies need to work together and share information in reference to potential 
targets of bulk cash and weapons smuggling into Mexico.  
Table 5 shows the judging criteria and the policy options for each location. 
Assumptions have been made in this thesis based on officer experience and 
logic; if CBP puts more people out there with more infrastructure and technology 
to look at vehicles and people, then more seizures will occur.  
  
Lincoln-Juarez 
Bridge Policy Option A Policy Option B Policy Option C 
Amount of Bulk Cash 
Detected $5 Million $10 Million $7.5 Million 
Number of Weapons 
Seizures 12 24 18 
Ease of Implementation Easy Difficult Medium 
Cost No additional Funding $27 Million $4.65 Million 
Free Flow of Traffic 0-5 Minutes 60 Minutes 10 Minutes 
 
San Ysidro POE Policy Option A Policy Option B Policy Option C 
Amount of Bulk Cash 
Detected $2 Million $4 Million $3 Million 
Number of Weapons 
Seizures 2 4 3 
Ease of Implementation Easy Difficult Medium 
Cost No additional Funding $71 Million $14.7 Million 
Free Flow of Traffic 5-10 Minutes 120 Minutes 15 Minutes 
Table 5.   Assessment Information for Lincoln-Juarez Bridge and San Ysidro POE 
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VII.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Studies indicate that the DTOs are continuing to operate and produce 
narcotics that are illegally transported across the borders. DTOs use multi-modal 
ways to attempt to smuggle the dope into the United States to sale. The profits 
from the drug sales are believed to be gathered in bulk and stored at stash 
houses throughout the United States (DOJ, 2010, p. 2). 
The primary role of bulk cash shipments into Mexico to the DTOs is to pay 
the operating costs for the various DTOs. This money is also used for corrupting 
law enforcement and government officials and for the DTO members to live 
extravagantly (Farah, 2010, p. 11). The bulk cash smuggling into Mexico will 
likely continue due to the U.S. anti-laundering regulations implemented after 
September 11, 2001 (Farah, 2010, p. 12).  
To limit the DTOs’ ability to continue to operate, the flow of bulk cash 
needs to be stopped. It is unrealistic to think that CBP working alone could 
identify all of the bulk cash being smuggled into Mexico. However, CBP would 
put a dent in the profits of the DTOs by identifying and seizing more bulk cash 
attempting to go south. Policy Option C or the hybrid solution would allow CBP to 
identify more bulk cash while minimizing costs. Policy Option B would allow for 
seizures of bulk cash as well but with the costs both for the construction, 
personnel, and loss of trade and commerce due to high traffic volumes, the 
hybrid solution would be the best option.  
As stated in this thesis, the violence in Mexico continues to grow and 
deaths are rising in Mexico each year. The weapons being smuggled into Mexico 
from the United States are contributing to the violence. The high-powered 
automatic weapons are being used by the DTOs to combat law enforcement, the 
military and other rivals to secure their territories. To lessen the violence, the 
United States can assist Mexico by identifying more weapons going south. Policy 
Option C is the best way for CBP to assist in curbing the illegal exportation of 
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weapons going south into Mexico. As stated previously, federal, state and local 
agencies need to develop and share intelligence on people and vehicles known 
to have a nexus with bulk cash, weapons, narcotics or human smuggling, which 
will allow CBP to target those people and conveyances under Policy Option C 
and stop more of the drug profits and weapons going south.  
The Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) is a multi-agency 
task force that seeks to identify and dismantle criminal organizations, such as the 
DTOs. The BEST initiative is lead by ICE under direction of the Secretary of 
DHS. Ten task forces on the SWB concentrate on the threats on the SWB in their 
area (Finklea, 2010, p. 28). This task force should work with CBP in the outbound 
environment in sharing intelligence targets for CBP to stop while attempting to go 
south. Valuable intelligence from this group is needed by CBP to be more 
productive in the outbound arena.  
Various other task forces within the federal, state and local law 
enforcement on the SWB could add to the intelligence needed by CBP to be 
effective. DHS needs to be a proponent of intelligence sharing within its own 
investigatory agencies, as well as to other federal, state and local agencies. In 
doing so, the ability to seize bulk cash and weapons will improve.  
The more money and weapons seized by CBP on the SWB will inhibit the 
DTOs’ ability to continue to operate as they currently do. Without the weapons, 
the DTOs will not have an advantage over local, state and federal law 
enforcement. Their ability to intimidate others and kidnap and kill will be limited 
as the weapons are seized and their arsenal is depleted.  
To cut off the flow of their profits is critical in attempting to disband or 
weaken the DTOs. If they are not profiting from the illicit sale of narcotics 
because CBP is seizing the bulk cash then their ability to operate and continue 
producing narcotics will lessen.  
Although CBP has moved towards outbound operations on the SWB, the 
need to strengthen the operations is vital to combating the DTOs. Some POEs 
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are currently conducting outbound operations on the SWB, such as Lincoln-
Juarez and San Ysidro. However, to be more effective on the SWB and identify 
more bulk cash and weapons going south, CBP needs to implement Policy 
Option C. This hybrid solution will maximize CBP’s ability to adapt to the current 
infrastructure in place, assess the most beneficial technology to implement, and 
determine the need for personnel and hours of operation. At the same time, it will 
be a more cost effective solution to implement.  
Although this thesis provided some estimates on costs, each location 
would need to be assessed to determine true costs for implementing any 
solution. It is clear that Policy Option A is the most inexpensive but it is also 
promotes the lowest productivity across all of the SWB POEs. Policy Option B is 
the most expensive with excessive costs for personnel and infrastructure. This 
option would provide CBP with more opportunities to identify bulk cash and 
weapons, but would be unrealistic in many locations due to the inability to 
expand the POE due to limited space, and the inability to purchase property 
rights.  
It is clear that the DTOs are continuing to operate and produce narcotics 
being smuggled into the United States. The sale of narcotics in the United States 
is the primary source of revenue for the DTOs to continue their drug operations. 
In addition, the profits from drug sales in the United States allows the DTOs to 
corrupt and bribe law enforcement and government officials, as well as to 
purchase automatic weapons to be smuggled south. With these weapons, the 
DTOs combat other DTOs for territory and continue to combat law enforcement 
efforts to stop the violence and drug producing business in Mexico. 
The Merida Initiative announced in October of 2007 was implemented by 
the United States and Mexico to combat DTOs, and the violence and crime 
committed by the DTOs. Congress appropriated $700 million dollars to assist 
Mexico with training, provide equipment and reform legislation (Beittel, summary 
page, 2009). More needs to be done to dismantle the DTO organizations and the 
crimes that they commit. Policy Option C is a way that CBP could contribute to 
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identifying bulk cash and weapons. In doing so, it is anticipated that the 
operations of the DTOs and the violence would decrease because the flow of 
bulk cash and weapons into Mexico would decrease.  
To achieve Policy Option C, CBP would have to do site visits or rely on 
previous site visits to determine the current infrastructure in place at each POE. 
However, most if not all of this information already exists with the Office of Field 
Operations in the mission support division and the Office of Information 
Technology.  
Each POE could have different levels of infrastructure, technology and 
personnel put into place based on the footprint of the southbound lanes and the 
amount of traffic that flows southbound into Mexico. CBP could use a phased in 
approach and prioritize the delivery of such a solution based on the threat of the 
DTOs on the other side of the border. With a strong policy option identified in 
Policy Option C, CBP would have transparency to show Congress when asking 
for the resources to implement such a solution.  
The time it takes to implement Policy Option C would be dependent upon 
the magnitude of work needed. In addition, the policy option could be delivered in 
phases. For example, mobile technology units could be given to officers working 
outbound until additional infrastructure and personnel could be added, which is 
currently being done on a small scale already. As funding becomes available and 
technology improves, additions can be added to individual locations based on 
site surveys and threat assessments.  
Policy Option C gives CBP flexibility in how much infrastructure and 
technology are needed and the personnel can be dependent upon how many 
shifts are being worked. However, to maximize the ability to detect export 
violations, such as bulk cash and weapons, CBP needs to ask for additional 
officers to work these outbound lanes. If no officers are available to work the 
outbound lanes, then even those targets identified by new technology 
implemented by new license plate readers will not be stopped and apprehended.  
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In recommending Policy Option C, after analyzing costs, effectiveness and 
ability to move traffic, it was apparent that this option made the most sense for 
CBP to adopt. In many locations where a lot of traffic does not move southbound, 
the minimal amount can be placed in that location. CBP could decide the hours 
of operation for the outbound teams and how many officers it would take to 
operate outbound inspections. Pulse and surge operations could be used based 
on traffic patterns or threat, and the officers would still have an advantage under 
this option because some technology would already be in place. For San Ysidro, 
which has little to no infrastructure, it would provide for a safer environment for 
the officers to work under and the ability to identify more vehicles and people 
involved in bulk cash and weapons smuggling. At the same time, it would 
improve CBP’s ability to identify stolen vehicles, and those individuals wanted for 
crimes in the United States. This solution would also improve the ability to 
determine who is departing the United States across the SWB. 
A clear need exists for a policy for outbound operations on the SWB. CBP 
has the authority to conduct outbound inspections, and if there is an interagency 
intelligence sharing initiative implemented as outlined in Policy Option C, this 
policy option will maximize the ability to prevent bulk cash and weapons 
smuggling into Mexico. 
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